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PREFACE 
A heated debate among American hsitorians has developed in 
the twentieth century over the motives behind the establishment of 
the Constitution. Two schools of historiography have emerged with 
contrasting viewpoints, each containing new insights into an old 
problem. In my historiographical essay, I explore the idea of a 
nationalist conspiracy as a possible motive for the birth of the 
Constitution. The major activities of the nationalists during 
the decade of the 17BO's are examined to see if, in fact, the 
nationalists formed an interstate coalition and were guilty of 
conspiring to overthrow the Articles of Confederation. 
The author wishes to express his most sincere appreciation 
to Dr. H. James Henderson for his inspiration of this study and 
guidance in the preparation of the thesis. I would like also 
to thank Dr. Theodore L. Agnew for his helpful comments and 
criticisms .. Finally, special gratitude is expressed to my wife, 
Carolyn, for her encouragement and assistance throughout.this 
study. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
When the thirteen colonies declared their independence in 1776, 
American political leaders immediately clashed over how to distribute 
power effectively between central and local authority. They realized 
that "in every government there must be a supreme, absolute authority 
1 lodged somewhere," but not all could agree upon the proper form that 
their new government should adopt. While some believed that the act 
of revolution had by necessity created one whole nation, most insisted 
that the new states should operate within the context of a.loose con-
federacy and should be semi-independent from one another. Between 
1776 and 1789 this dualism in American political thought divided Amer-
icans into two large, amorphous groups. 2 
The nationalists or centralists, who later adopted the name of 
Federalists for strategic purposes, were dedicated to the idea of a 
supreme national government which would limit the activities of the 
state governments to purely local affairs. Alexander Hamilton best 
expressed the feeling when he wrote that "the Confederation should 
1 Samuel Seabury, "A View of the Controversy Between Great Brit-
ain and Her Colonies," quoted in Alpheus Thomas ·Mason, The States 
Rights Debate: Antifederalists and the Constitution (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J., 1964 ["with selected documents"]), p. 18. 
2Merrill Jensen, The New Nation (New York, 1950), p. 425; Wil-
liam P. Murphy, The Triumph of Nationalism (Chicago, 1967), p. 18; 
Mason, pp. 8-9. 
2 
give Congress complete sovereignty, except as to that part of internal 
police which relates to the rights of property and life among individ-
uals, and to raising money by internal taxes. 113 These men of "con-
tinental vision" such as Alexander Hamilton, Robert Morris, James 
Madison, James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris and George Washington ab-
horred the principle of state sovereignty, and they hoped to curtail 
this natural impulse of the Revolutionary movement. They believed 
that "no boundary could be drawn between the National and State Legis-
latures; that the former must therefore have indefinite authority. 114 
The nationalists, especially Hamilton, placed loyalty to the nation 
as a whole far above attachments to individual states. As Hamilton 
phrased it in his series "The Continentalist," 
there is something noble and magnificent in the perspec-
tive of a great Faederal Republic, closely linked in the 
pursuit of a common interest, tranquil and prosperous at 
home, respectable abroad; but there is something propor-
tionably diminutive in the prospect of a number of petty 
states, with the appear~nce only of union, jarring, jeal-
ous and perverse •.•• 
Not trusting leagues or confederacies, the nationalists preferred the 
idea of a consolidated government. 
In contrast, the anti-nationalists or republicans, who were 
later branded quite unfairly by the Federalists or nationalists as 
3Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, September 3, 1780, in Harold 
C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 
(New York, 1961- ), II, pp. 407-408. 
4 Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 
(New Haven, 1911-1937), I, p. 323. 
511 The Continentalist," July 4, 1782, in Syrett and Cook, III, 
p. 106. 
3 
anti-Federalists, 6 believed in a league of states with a weak central 
government. Fearful that "power of all kinds has an irresistible pro-
pensity to increase a desire for itself," anti-nationalists wished 
"that the power of Congress be accurately defined and that an adequate 
7 
check be provided to prevent any excess." At first, the anti-
nationalists had the weight of logic on their side, and they assailed 
the nationalists with difficult questions. How could a strong central 
government be justified when a war was being fought against Britain 
to eliminate a tyrannical central authority? Why should an individual 
free himself from one central government overseas only to be enslaved 
by another many miles away? Led by such revolutionary leaders as 
Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, George Clinton, and 
8 Thomas Burke, they desired a compact to be established in which 
"Congress should have power enough to call out and apply the common 
strength for the common defense, but not for the partial purposes of 
ambition. 119 The anti-nationalists were not opposed to the idea of a 
6 Jackson T. Main, The Antifederalists (Chapel Hill, 1961), pp. xi-
xv. Agreeing with Professor Main's contention that the Antifederalists 
were not mere obstructionists but did have a positive program of their 
own, I shall refer to the opponents of the Federalists as Antifeder-
alists rather than as anti-Federalists. 
7Thomas Burke to the Governor of North Carolina, March 11, 1777, 
in Edmund c. Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental 
Congress (Washington, D. c., 1921-1936), II, p-.-294. 
8Elisha P. Douglass, "Thomas Burke, Disillusioned Democrat," The 
North Carolina Historical Review, XXVI (April, 1949), p. 150, p. 173. 
Douglass points out that Burke was soon to desert the states' rights 
cause in favor of a national tariff and that "he led the fight for 
centralized authority in the Continental Congress in 1780." 
9Thomas Burke to the Governor of North Carolina, April 29, 1777, 
in Burnett, II, p. 346. 
4 
nation, as their opponents often charged. However, they were opposed 
to any central government so organized as to thwart republican ideals 
and be less responsive to the needs of the people. As anti-
nationalist delegates from Massachusetts pointed out to their state 
legislature, 
we are for increasing the power of Congress as far as 
it will promote the Happiness of the people, but at the 
same Time are clearly of the Opinion that every Measure 
should be avoided which would strengthen the Hands of 
the Enemies to a free Government.10 
Whereas their adversaries favored a strong and energetic nation at 
the expense of republicanism, anti-nationalists believed "fiercely 
in republicanism and but secondarily in the nation. 1111 
In addition to waging a war against Great Britain, Americans 
had to solve an internal dispute of the greatest significance. Ben-
jamin Rush captured the prevailing mood in the new nation when he 
observed that 
the time is now past when the least danger is to be ap-
prehended to our liberties from Britain, the arts of 
commissioners or the machinations of tories. Tyranny 12 
can now enter our country only in the shape of a whig. 
Between 1776 and 1789, a serious conflict characterized by extensive 
pamphleteering, bitter debates within Congress, unprincipled abuses 
of power by state legislatures and even nationalist intrigue swept 
over the country, leaving many conflicting opinions not only among 
10 Massachusetts Congressmen to the State legislature, September 
3, 1785, Ibid., VIII, p. 209. 
11 Forrest McDonald, E Pluribus Unum (Boston, 1965), p. 2. 
12Benjamin Rush to William Gordon, December 10, 1778, quoted 
in Gordon s. Wood, The creation of the American Republic (Chapel 
Hill, 1969), p. 396. 
5 
the principal actors involved but also among the large number of 
historians who have written about the men and the events of this 
period. Both sides would enjoy the fruits of victory and suffer 
serious reversals, but the final Federalist victory in 1789 would 
endure the test of time. 
The first clash between nationalists and anti-nationalists 
occurred in the debates of the second Continental Congress over the 
nationalist-inspired Dickinson draft. In July, 1776, Congress had 
appointed a drafting committee headed by John Dickinson to the task 
of forming a plan of government. Dickinson's proposal placed the 
balance of power with the central government. "The Dickinson draft, 
while by no means as explicit as the Constitution of 1787, made the 
constitution of the central government the standard by which the 
13 
rights, powers, and duties of the states were to be measured." 
However, at this point in the Revolution the nationalists were only 
a minority in Congress, and the Dickinson draft encountered firm 
opposition from the anti-nationalists. After much debate, primarily 
between James Wilson and Thomas Burke, the anti-nationalists easily 
defeated the nationalist measure in April, 1777. The anti-
nationalists amended the Dickinson draft into the Articles of Con-
federation and submitted their proposal to the states for approval. 
In the Articles, the interests of the states were preserved and 
protected against any possible oppressive central authority. 
In 1781 it appeared as though the anti-nationalists had won 
the internal contest. As a result of Maryland's ratification, the 
13Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation (Madison, 1940), 
p. 130, 
6 
first American constitution, the Articles of Confederation, became a 
reality. Although Congress had the power to make war or peace, to 
make treaties and alliances, to settle interstate disputes and to 
borrow money, the real power belonged to the states. Congress could 
make requisitions and could request payment from the states, but it 
could not directly tax the states. Without any power to enforce 
taxation, Congress could only hope that the states would submit their 
allotments on a regular basiso Indeed, the anti-nationalists could 
rejoice at their accomplishment because they believed that in creating 
the new government they had stayed within the bounds of the "spirit 
of 1776." 
Yet in the years following 1781 the nationalists made tremen-
dous gains which finally enabled them to effect a peaceful coup 
d'etat in 1787. Although it hardly seemed so in 1781, the Articles 
proved to be disastrous to the anti-nationalists and a blessing to 
the nationalists. As Merrill Jensen pointed out in his book, The 
Articles of Confederation, "the radical organization which had 
brought about the Revolution disintegrated with success, for the 
radicals had won their real goal, local self-government. 1114 In 
much the same manner as Jensen, William Murphy stated that after 
1781 the anti-nationalists "devoted their energies to local matters 
rather than to Congress and failed to maintain the organization which 
had brought about their triumph. 1115 
After the nationalists had lost the debate on the Dickinson 
14Ibid., p. 240. 
15 Murphy, p. 31, 
7 
draft and the Articles had become established, they had a single goal 
and a common cause which they steadily pursued during the uncertain 
first years of the Confederation. 
They too could call conventions [wrote Jensen]. They 
too could paint dark pictures of the times and blame 
the supposed woes of the country on the Articles of 
Confederation, as the radicals had blamed the British 
government before 1776.16 
During the 1780's the nationalists attempted to strengthen 
Congress through constitutional amendments, but each attempt failed 
just as it appeared to be on the brink of success. Some were des-
perate enough to hope to link the Army to their cause, but that dark 
and mysterious conspiracy quickly foundered. After attempting to 
achieve change through the constitutional framework, a few bold men 
initiated a counterrevolution that succeeded in replacing the origi-
nal constitution with a more conservative document. The actions of 
the nationalists during the Confederation period kindled one of the 
most important debates in American historiography. 
After ratification, men of both the Federalist and the Antifed-
eralist persuasion accepted the Constitution in good faith .and de-
cided to work within that framework. 17 It is true, of course, that 
the valuable addition of the Bill of Rights did much to appease the 
opponents of the Constitution and to prevent possible repercussions. 
The problem in the 1790's became how to interpret the inherent and 
implied powers of the Constitution rather than how to alter drasti-
16 Jensen, Articles of Confederation, p. 245. 
17James Madison, "A Candid State of.Parties," September 26, 
1792, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison (New 
York, 1901-1906), VI, p. 113. 
8 
cally the existing document as had been the case in the crisis of 
1787. Therefore, it is not surprising that few historians criticized 
nationalist tactics for nearly one hundred and twenty years after the 
adoption of the Constitution. After all, historians were only fol-
lowing what they considered to be the evidence of the period--that 
being primarily the correspondence of the Federalists. 18 Unfor-
tunately, they chose to ignore the Antifederalist position. Forrest 
McDonald, a twentieth-century historian of the Constitutional period, 
has pointed out that "as a general rule the verdict of history has 
been the view held by the winner. 1119 The "Nationalist" historians 
of the nineteenth century accepted the dictates of this general rule. 
More recently historians have seriously questioned the motives behind 
the framing of the Constitution. 
To begin a study of interpretations of the Constitution, one 
may choose among the findings of the "Nationalist" school, the 
"Progressive" school, the "Nee-Conservative" school, and several 
historians who simply cannot be classified under any one heading. 
In examining the twentieth-century accounts, one discovers that some 
historians have used the idea of a nationalist conspiracy to describe 
the efforts of the founding fathers in attempting to secure a strong 
central governmento By conspiracy, it is meant that through secret 
18Murphy, pp. 41-42: "The success of ,the campaign [of 1787] is 
demonstrated by the fact that nationalist ex parte writings--an in-
separable blend of factual reporting and political propaganda--have 
been widely accepted by succeeding generations of Americans as good. 
and true history." 
19Forrest McDonald, "The Anti-Federalists, 1781-1789," The 
Wisconsin Magazine of History, XLVI (Spring, 1963), p. 214. 
9 
arrangements and agreements the nationalists banded together to over-
throw the legally existent Articles of Confederation. Of course, 
the notion of a nationalist conspiracy is only one alternative, and 
frequently the question of conspiracy must be couched in broader 
considerations of the movement toward the Constitution. However, in 
this essay, the examination will be limited to the actions of the 
nationalist leadership in the context of a possible conspiracy. Was 
there a true conspiracy on the part of a small but influential elite 
to replace the Articles when in actuality the Articles would have 
sufficed, or were there truly giants in the land who possessed the 
political sagacity to strive for a new government capable of rescuing 
the country from impending disaster? It is my contention that the 
nationalists only acted as conservatives when they worked to replace 
the Articles, and by so doing established responsible government on 
the deathbed of an extreme kind of egalitarian democracy. Only a 
critical analysis of the strengths and shortcomings of the three 
major schools in the context of the two broad nationalist movements 
of the 1780's can provide a suitable framework for a question which 
will undoubtedly be a subject of debate as long as there are Ameri-
can historians. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PROGRESSIVE PERSUASION AND THE 
FIRST NATIONALIST THRUST 
For the most part historians, like the two groups of colonial 
Americans, have taken opposite views on the Confederation period and 
the necessity for the Constitution. On one side, George Bancroft and 
John Fiske believed that the new nation was falling apart because of 
1 the lack of a strong central government. They leaned heavily upon 
the argument that national honor and prestige could only be maintained 
through a sturdy central government. Therefore, they believed that 
the Constitution was quite necessary to the future success of the 
United states, and they failed to consider any kind of nationalist 
conspiracy during the Confederation period. To Bancroft and Fiske, 
the nationalists were what some contemporary admirers of the founding 
fathers considered them to be--demigods who cast aside their self-
interest in favor of creating a government which would be beneficial 
to all Americans. It was only through the efforts and political in-
sight of these impressive statesmen that America was saved from anar-
chy and economic chaos. As Bancroft so dramatically summed up the 
unsteady times of the Confederation period in his monumental work, 
1George Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution of 
the United States of America (New York, 1882), I:-p~262-266; John 
Fiske, The Critica-i:-Period of American History, 1783-1789 (New York, 
1888), pp. 98-100. 
11 
"no ray of hope remained" 2 save the Philadelphia Convention. 
During the nineteenth century, this traditional view of the Con-
federation period dominated American interpretation of the origins of 
the Constitution. Unfortunately, Bancroft's history was not free from 
the influence of the period in which he wrote. The United States had 
just been through the devastating effects of the Civil War, and the 
Bancroft thesis satisfied the need for unification. There was never 
any doubt that the intentions of the framers of the Constitution had 
been anything less than honorable. However, this view was to change 
drastically with the appearance of the "revisionist" or "Progressive" 
school of historians. Patriotism was replaced by special class 
interests. 
"Revisionist" historians J. Allen Smith, A. M. Simons, Charles 
Beard, Vernon L. Parrington, Louis M. Hacker, Merrill Jensen and Jack-
son T. Main did not look upon the founding fathers and the drive for 
the Constitution in a favorable light. They believed that the Consti-
tution .was a thorough repudiation of the Revolution and the Articles 
of Confederation and that it represented a conservative victory. 3 To 
these historians, the nationalists were most definitely engaged in a 
conspiracy to supplant democratic ideals. 
Armed with the belief that the Articles best expressed the politi-
2 Bancroft, I, p. 266. 
3J. Allen Smith, The Spirit of American Government (New York, 
1907), pp. 22-38; A. M. Simons, Social Forces in American History (New 
York, 1912), pp. 82-92; Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of 
the Constitution of the United States (New York, 1913), pp. 52-64; 
Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought (New York, 
1930), I, pp. 273-279; Louis M. Ha.cker, The Triumph of American Capi-
talism (New York, 1940), pp. 178-185; Jensen, New Nation, pp. 422-428; 
Main, Antifederalists, p. 17. 
12 
cal philosophy of the Revolution, J, Allen Smith, author of The Spirit 
of American Government, challenged the traditional view. Under the 
Articles, the colonists had discarded the British imperial system of 
checks and balances in favor of legislative supremacy. In the framing 
of the Constitution checks and balances were once again installed into 
the framework of government. Smith argued that democracy in the form 
of legislative majorities was stifled by the efforts of the founding 
fathers at Philadelphia because the Constitution was a political re-
. b h lf f th 1 h d . rnb f . t 4 action on ea o .e wea t y an conservative me ers o socie y. 
Only a few years later, A. M. Simons, following Smith's approach, 
accused the founding fathers of a "secret conspiratory coup d'etat 
5 
such as most historians congratulate America on having escaped." To 
Simons, commercial interests played the largest part in the formation 
of the new government, and the struggle centered primarily on the in-
dustrial and mercantile creditors on the coast versus the farmer debt-
ors of the interior. 
If Smith and Simons startled the Nationalist historians out of 
their lethargy, it was Charles Beard who really shook the very foun-
dations upon which .Bancroft and Fiske had based their work. To Beard, 
the economic nationalism of the founding fathers logically led to 
political nationalism. Beard put forth the idea that "the founding 
fathers made up a small militant interest group whose interests knew 
6 
no state boundaries and were truly national in their scope." Believ-
4smith, p. 28, 
5simons, p. 92. 
6 Beard, p, 325. 
13 
ing that the Constitution did not truly represent the wishes of the 
people, Beard stressed the economic .. considerations that incited the 
nationalists to conspire for a centralized government. Not only would 
some be able to get benefits from the new government through their 
holdings of public securities, but they would also be assured of com-
pletely smothering the levelling tendencies of some of the state legis-
latures which had hurt the conservative cause after the Revolution. To 
Beard, the Confederation period exhibited a tremendous class conflict 
between a wealthy class of creditors.and a class of small farmers who 
opposed the nationalist thrust. Beard concluded that "the Constitution 
was an economic document drawn with superb skill by men whose property 
interests were at stake; anq as such it appealed directly and unerring-
ly to identical int;erests in the country at large. 117 Thus, almost. 
overnight, the Olympian statesmen had been reduced to selfish profi-
teers. 
The approach taken by members of the Progressive school received 
great stimulation in 1926 from the appearance of John Franklin Jame-
son's influential book on the American Revolution. In The American 
Revolution Considered as a Social Movement Jameson, like Beard, expan-
ded the historical quest into new and fertile areas because he be-
lieved that ."it was vain to think of the Revolution as solely a series 
of political or military events~ 118 Jameson stressed the social con-
sequences of the Revolution as they applied to the status of persons, 
7 Ibid., p. 188. 
8J. Franklin Jameson, The American Revolution Considered as a 
Social Movement (Princeton, 1926), p. 26. 
14 
land, commerce and industry, and thought and feeling. He concluded 
that the nationalists drew their greatest support from the commercial 
classes in the struggle to strengthen the central government during 
9 the 1780's. The "Beard thesis" thus appeared to be justified and 
sound, and historians could not even consider the campaign for the 
Constitution without complete knowledge of Charles Beard's landmark 
in American historiography. 
Beard's influence was tremendous, and several historians made 
good use of the Beardian approach in their work. To Vernon Parrington, 
the adoption of the Constitution impeded the advance of democracy in 
America. He maintained that the Constitution allowed an aristocratic 
minority to hold the reins of power at the expense of the majority of 
the people. "Although the new Constitution professed.to rest on the 
sovereignty of the people, the men who framed it refused to interpret 
10 the term, sovereignty of the people, in an equalitarian sense," 
wrote Parrington. In the minds of the founding fathers, the dangerous 
levelling spirit of democracy was curbed by orderly and responsible 
government. The efforts and energies of the common man to secure the 
democratic promise of the Revolution were subverted by a small but 
wealthy interest group. Continuing in the same vein, Fred Rodell des-
cribed the Constitution as "a threat to. the liberty so hard-won and so 
11 
recently won from England." Other historians were soon to join the 
Progressive persuasion. Louis M. Hacker in his book The Triumph of 
9Ibid., p. 71. 
lO ' t I 283 Parring on, , p. • 
11 Fred Rodell, Fifty-five Men (New York, 1936), p. 198. 
15 
American Capitalism attacked the traditional Nationalist argument that 
the young nation was falling into economic chaos after the war with 
Britain. To Hacker, the breakdown in the economic system was due to 
an overextension on the part of the merchants rather than to defects 
in the Articles. 12 Also, Robert East refuted the "critical period" 
idea by saying that the deplorable economic state frequently attrib-
uted to the Confederation period simply did not exist. 13 Hacker be-
lieved that during the period leading up to the Constitution a conflict 
took place between men with large property interests and radicals, with 
the result being that the conservatives took advantage of the agitation 
and temporary recession "to entrench themselves once and for all in 
14 the seats of government." 
Recently the two chief disciples of Beard have been Merrill Jen-
sen and Jackson T. Main. Both historians believed that the Articles 
of Confederation were a direct expression of the political heritage 
of the Revolution. Like Beard, Jensen saw the struggle over the Con-
stitution in terms of a polarized conflict between conservatives and 
radicals. However, unlike Beard, who accepted the traditional view 
that the Confederation was indeed a critical period, Jensen argued 
that 
the ucritical period" idea was the result of an uncriti-
cal acceptance of the arguments of a victorious party 
in a long political battle, of a failure to face the 
12 Hacker, p. 178. 
13Robert A. East, Business Enterprise in the American Revolution-
ary Era (New York, 1938), p. 238. 
14 Hacker, p. 178. 
fact that partisan propaganda is not history but only 
historical evidenceol5 
It is in this area of stressing the worth and value of the Confed-
eration period that Jensen has been most persuasive. For instance, 
16 
three land ordinances were passed which determined the basic policies 
for expansion into the Westo Also, a permanent staff of government 
employees, a bureaucracy, was firmly established during this periodo 
Perhaps most important of all, the Articles provided a foundation 
upon which to build a more stable and effective central government 
which could meet the demands of the new and expanding nation. But 
Jensen's contention was that this stronger government could have been 
a revitalized Articles of Confederation rather than the new form pro-
posed in 1787. 
In a book most sympathetic toward the plight of the Antifederal-
ists, Jackson T, Main has recently expressed the view that the Anti-
federalists were the true representatives of the American people. 
He argued that "although the Antifederalist position was employed to 
mask special interests, it was fundamentally anti-aristocratic and 
therefore peculiarly congenial to those who were tending toward 
16 democracy." The primary Antifederalist concern throughout the 
1780's was to guard against excessive consolidation in the central 
government which they believed would lead to aristocratic tyranny. 
Antifederalists were convinced that "the state governments will al-
ways possess a better representation of the feelings and interests 
15 Jensen, New Nation, p. 422. 
16Main, Antifederalists, p. 281. 
17 
of the people at large" and that the power of the people "can be de-
posited with much greater safety with the state than the general 
17 governmento" Throughout his book, Main put forth the notion that 
the Antifederalists were maneuvered out of favor and power by a 
dynamic core of nationalists engaged in a conspiracy. Main agrees 
with Jensen that 
in the name of the people they [the nationalists] engi-
neered a conservative counterrevolution and erected a 
nationalistic government whose purpose in part was to 
thwart the will of 11 the people" in whose.name they 
acted. 18 
Although it is true that the Progressive historians have been 
recently out of favor, they nevertheless made many valuable contri-
butions to the study of the Constitutiono To the Nationalist histo-
rians, the Confederation government was not only weak and contemptible--
it could hardly be termed government at all. Andrew McLaughlin 
characte.riz~d it best as "a general system which was creaking in 
19 
every joint and beginning to hobble at every step." The Progressive 
historians, especially Jensen, have been able to correct this old view 
considerably and have been able to prove that the Confederation period 
merits as much approval as any othe~ period in American history. To 
Jensen, "the story is one of a newly free people who seized upon 
every means to improve and enrich .themselves in a nation they believed 
17Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several State Conven-
tions~ the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Philadelphia, 1907), 
II, p. 2170 
18 Jensen, Articles of Confederation, p. 2450 
19Andrew c. McLaughlin,! Constitutional History of the United 
· States (New York, 1935), p. 137 o 
18 
had a golden destiny. 1120 Also, by introducing the idea of economic 
profit into the drive for the Constitution, the Progressives trans-
formed the founding fathers from demigods into men. The Progressives 
may have been carried away with economic.determinism and may have 
d h ' h ' 21 h d b overstate t e1r case, as t e Nee-Conservatives ave suggeste, ut 
at least they did point out an important facet totally ignored by the 
traditional historians. Perhaps in no other area have the Progres-
sives been so successful as they have been in showing the nationalists 
in operation during the first of two concerted drives toward a powerful, 
centralized government. 
However, it is interesting to note that the Progressive historians 
were not·the first to point out.the significance of the early nation-
alist thrust. That honor belongs to Abraham Yates, a contemporary 
critic of the nationalists, who vehemently attacked the operations of 
Robert Morris and his nationalist-minded associates as being the 
efforts of an aristocratic elite bent upon destroying the freedom and 
liberties of the people. Yates accused the nationalists of employing 
devious tactics 
to propagate among the People that the Confederacy was 
defective, that too much power remained in the hands of 
the People and the several state legislatures and that 
Congress was not vested with powers sufficient for their 
peace or protection.22 
20 Jensen, New Nation, p. 424. 
21 See Chapter III for a more complete explanation of the Neo-
Conservative school. 
22 Abraham Yates, "The Yates Manuscript," in Staughton Lynd, Class 
Conflict, Slavery and the United States Constitution (New York, 1967), 
p. 227. 
19 
Although Yates' arguments were sometimes based upon passion rather 
than upon evidence, the Leftist historian Staughton Lynd has recently 
noted that 
it was something of an achievement that, writing in the 
midst of the.events with the aid of a few documents 
beyond the journals of the Continental Congress, Yates 
approximated so nearly the current textbook picture.23 
In examining several crucial events during the early period of 
the Confederation, one discovers how the first nationalist thrust 
operated under the leadership of Robert Morris and how historians have 
reacted to it. The Progressive historians have seen the potential for 
dictatorship in the schemes of the wealthy businessman and inter-
national merchant, Robert Morris. Having accumulated a large fortune 
during the early years of the Revolution, Morris in 1781 turned to the 
movement to strengthen Congress and through the aid of his many con-
nections "wielded more power in the United states than any man had yet 
24 done." Even Neo-Conservative historians have acknowledged the 
strength and influence of Morris. Distrustful of the influence of 
private business in republican government, 25 the anti-nationalists 
attempted to limit the power being amassed by Morris, and they only 
yielded to his demands when they absolutely had to in order to stimu-
late the war effort. One of Morris' political enemies lamented that 
since Morris had assumed his position of Superintendent of Finance 
"the business of that august body [Congress] has been extremely simpli-
23rbid., p. 223. 
24 Jensen, New Nation, p. 56. 
25 McDonald; E Pluribus Unum, p. 6. 
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fied, Mr. Morris having relieved them from all business of deliberation 
or executive difficulty with which money is in any respect connected. 
,,26 Content to allow the end to justify the means, Morris almost 
singlehandedly directed the government until he resigned from his 
office in 1784, and only then could the anti-nationalists feel any 
1 . f' th ' t 1 t k th t' 1 ' t 27 re 1e 1n e1r s rugg e o eep e Ar 1c es 1n act. 
This early drive failed because the Morris network collapsed at 
a critical moment, but it set the stage for the spectacular success of 
the second thrust that was soon.to follow under the auspices of Madison 
and Hamilton in 1787. As E, James Ferguson stated in his neo-Beardian 
book, The Power of the Purse, the aims and motives of the Morris junto 
"were similar even in detail to those of tbe Federalists who later 
28 drafted the Constitution and enactec;i Hamilton's funding program." 
In both phases, the nationalists not only desired to invest Congress 
with greater executive control in order to provide a check against 
what they considered to be excessive legislative power, but they also 
insisted that Congress rather than the individual states be placed in 
charge of funding the national debt. As good politicians, the nation-
alists frequently exaggerated the dangers, both real and imaginary, to 
the Union, and they never lacked a program to remedy the ills of 
26 Joseph Reed to General Greene, November [?], 1781, quoted in 
Jensen, New Nation, p. 60. 
27 Massachusetts Congressmen to the State legislature, September 3, 
1785, in Burnett, VIII, p. 208: ". , • plans have been artfully laid, 
and vigorously pursued, which had they been successful, We think would 
inevitably have changed our republican Governments into baleful Aris-
tocracies." 
28E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse (Chapel Hill, 1961), 
p. 109. 
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the nation, 
Even before the Articles had been completely ratified, Alexander 
Hamilton expressed discontent in 1780 over the weakness and lack of 
energy in Congress. He urged the immediate call for a convention to 
correct the deficiencies of Congress because he felt the disorders 
in the nation were "too violent to admit of a common or lingering 
29 
remedy," Not only was Hamilton's letter "the first clear-cut, 
responsible appeal for the kind of convention that met at last in 
1787, 1130 but it also foreshadowed the discontent with the Articles 
that would prompt a cohesive group of nationalists, according to the 
Progressives, to decide that conditions.in the new nation were ripe 
for a general reform of the government and a coup d'etat to achieve 
this end if necessary. 
In 1781 the Congressional nationalists made a bid for power. The 
New York nationalist James Duane wrote enthusiastically to Washington 
that 
the day is at length arrived when dangers and distresses 
have opened the eyes of.the people and they perceive the 
want of a common head to draw forth in some just propor-
ti~n t~I resources of the several branches of the federal 
union, 
Since the nationalists hoped to impart greater effici~ncy to the 
government of the new nation, especially in conducting the war effort, 
29Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, September 3, 1780, in Syrett 
and Cooke, II, p. 407. 
30clinton Rossiter, Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution (New 
York, 1964), p. 37. 
31 James Duane to George Washington, January 29, 178i in Burnett, 
VI P• 551. 
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they decided that various departments ought to be headed by individuals 
outside Congress rather than by the standing committees of members of 
Congress. They carried the issue successfully but did encounter 
opposition from the outnumbered anti-nationalists in Congress. 
Following much the same line of reasoning that they had in the 
Dickinson draft debates, the anti-nationalists questioned this politi-
cal move by their opponents on account of their fear of a dictatorship 
which they believed could have easily resulted. Their experiences 
with the British ministers and monarch had taught them that power 
should never be entru$ted to a single individual. The fears of the 
anti-nationalists soon seemed justified when the stress of the war 
coupled with the ardent support of the nationalist front elevated 
Robert Morris to unprecedented heights of power. 
Throughout.the war with Britain, Congress had always had diffi-
culty in paying the Continental Army. The paper-money schemes of 
Congress in the late 1770's failed miserably, and all available money 
was continually absorbed in the expense of keeping the soldiers fed 
and clothed. As a result, the possibility of army insurrections 
plagued the members of Congress, and they realized that they had to 
discover a means of obtaining revenue to meet the needs of paying the 
army. Alexander Hamilton, an aide-de-camp to General Washington at 
this time, made clear the tenuous nature of relations between the 
army and Congress when he said that the army is "now a mob" and that 
32 
"we begin to hate the· country for its neglect of us." In desperation, 
32Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, September 3, 1780, in Syrett 
and Cooke, II, p. 406. 
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Congress appointed Robert Morris as Superintendent of Finance in the 
expectation that he could perform miracles of financial wizardry. The 
consequence of this action was a well-organized nationalist thrust that 
almost succeeded in replacing the basic fr~mework of the Articles of 
Confederation, 
With enormous financial pow~rs at his disposal, Morris decided 
that an impost would help to strengthen the central government, The 
impost would allow Congress to levy a duty of 5% on the value of all 
goods imported into the United States, The only stumbling block for 
Morris was the rule on amendments under the Articles of Confederation, 
All the states had to ratify the proposal before the impost could go 
into effect, To achieve this goal, Robert Morris and the nationalist 
network tried to persuade the leaders in the states of the necessity 
of adopting an impost. Eleven of the states, excluding Georgia (which 
was under British control) and Rhode Island, ratified the impost, In 
! Pluribus Unum, Forrest McDonald stated that the greedy motives of a 
group of wealthy speculators from Providence stopped Rhode Island from 
. h . t 33 approving t e 1mpos , The Rhode Island incident pointed out a grave 
defect in the Confederation that the nationalists would capitalize on 
in later years, The vote of one state had kept the amendment from 
becoming law, and the nationalists in 1787 bypassed the almost impos-
sible task of amending the Articles by calling for an extra-legal 
proceeding which would give the opportunity to discard the format of 
the Articles and to create a strong and effective form of government, 
At the moment that the group of nationalists in Congress was arguing 
33 
McDonald, E Pluribus Unum, p. 21, 
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that Congress possessed an "undefined power" to coerce Rhode Island 
into agreement on the impost, Virginia repealed its ratification, The 
death of the impost of 1781 was a stunning blow to the nationalists' 
hope of consolidation. However, the inability of Congress to pay the 
army provided the nationalists with another chance. Robert Morris, 
Gouverneur Morris and Alexander Hamilton had a devious plan they hoped 
to employ, If the army could be linked to the public creditors, then 
enough momentum might be created to carry through the financial dreams 
of Robert Morris, and the "necessity and discontents of the army pre-
sented themselves as a powerful engine, 1134 
Historians have differed in their interpretation of this nation-
alist surge. The traditional view is that no conspiracy existed between 
public creditors and the army for the overthrow of the Articles of 
Confederation. However, Merrill Jensen believed that this was a true 
conspiracy "to acquire by force what·the facts of wartime necessity 
35 
and endless argument could not achieve .• " Similarly, Richard H. Kohn 
has recently concluded that a plot existed. Hamilton, Robert Morris 
and Gouverneur Morris were the principal actors, and others were in-
36 
valved in varying degrees. 
34Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, April 8, 1783, in 
Syrett and Cooke, III, p, 319. Since 1780, Hamilton had been insisting 
upon the need to use the army as a tool to strengthen the Congress, 
which he considered impotent. 
35 Jensen, New Nation, p. 399. 
36Richard H, Kohn, "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: 
America and the Coup D'Etat," The William and Mary Quarterly, XXVII 
(April, 1970), p. 193, Kohn points out that the staunch nationalist 
James Madison "probably knew nothing directly of the manipulations 
behind the scenes" but did perceive the overall picture, 
25 
The nationalist "conspirators" did not succeed in allying the 
army to their primary purpose, whatever that may have been" They had 
counted upon Washington's influence, especially after Hamilton's letter 
to the General described the perils which the nation facedo But, they 
were sadly disappointed when Washington foiled the plot by delivering 
37 
a stirring address to the leading officers at Newburgh" Washington's 
patriotic response came after an anonymous paper had been circulated 
throughout.the camp urging the army to press immediately for a redress 
of its grievances. With discontent and suffering already at a very 
high level within the ranks, Washington foresaw the possibility of 
calamitous civil war. Therefore, he urged the officers to remain 
patient and to continue to respect the Congress and the Union. While 
Washington contained the explosive situation at Newburgh, Congress con-
tinued to grapple with the meager finances at hand and finally arrived 
at a solution acceptable to the Continental Army: Congress promised 
the officers a bonus of five years' payo 
During the first nationalist thrust, Morris marshalled support 
from two very different pressure groups, a Middle States business 
alliance and a fraternity of Army officers. Throughout the early 
years of the Revolution, Robert Morris had formed many economic coa-
litions which transcended state boundarieso He had business partner-
37Jensen, New Nation, p. 7lo Richard Kohn (pp. 201-203) disa-
grees with Jensen over what the nationalists expected from Washington, 
and he believes that Hamilton's letter.to Washington (February 13, 
1783) served as a tip-off. Convinced that Washington would never in-
cite rebellion in the ranks on his own, the nationalists realized they 
would have to depend on his rivals in order to set off.the mutinyo 
However, once it had started, the nationalists desired that Washington 
be well informed so that he could control the level of rebellion. 
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ships with prominent merchants in almost every major city, and through 
his untiring efforts, he had made the public creditors in the Middle 
States effective agitators for a strong central governmento As Super-
intendent of Finance, Morris had been given the power .to establish the 
Bank of North America, and he had been most successful in linking his 
business partners and other men of wealth to the Bank. As the focal 
point of the Morris network, the Bank helped to tie the interstate 
coalitions of merchants more closely together. Morris believed that 
the interests of commerce and industry could best be served on a 
national basis rather than within the confines of each individual 
state. By investing in the Bank of North America, merchants were in-
vesting in the future success of the Uniono 
In addition to the business coalition, General Knox in 1783 had 
founded "an informed, influential and durable pressure group interested 
both emotionally and financially in strengthening the Uniono 1138 Com-
posed of ex-officers of the Continental line, the Society of the Cin-
cinnati possessed the potential of becoming a dangerous threat to 
civilian rule in the United States. This elitist society has provoked 
interesting comment from several historians. John Fiske stated that 
"no political purpose was to be subserved by the order of the Cincin-
nati, save in so far as the members pledged to one another their deter-
39 
mination to promote and cherish the union between the states." 
Merrill Jensen and Robert Rutland pointed out.evidence that some states-
men were convinced that the Society of the Cincinnati from the beginning 
38 McDonald, E Pluribus Unum, p. 33. 
39 ' k 115 Fis e, p. o 
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would have been willing to use force, if necessary, to achieve the 
40 
adoption of a strong central governmento In the book Alexander 
Hamilton and the Constitution, John Miller believed that the Society 
was prepared to take drastic action to support the conservative 
O f O O 1 11 0 d O 1 41 interests o society against eve ing ra ica So 
The early nationalist onslaught came to an end in 1784 with the 
disintegration of the Middle States coalition. Human greed and the 
lust for power, rather than any heroic.efforts on the part of the 
anti-nationalists, caused the alliance to split apart. Robert Morris 
was not without enemies, and these were bent upon destroying his 
financial empire and the Bank. Hoping to further the interests of a 
state bank, Charles Pettit, a Philadelphia merchant, launched a 
powerful crusade against Morris and the Bank of North America--a 
movement that succeeded in causing serious tension within the Morris 
network. With the attack on the Bank, many men of wealth began to 
desert Morris. Outside investors, such as Wadsworth and Church, 
demanded that their money be given back. As the panic continued to 
build, others found it profitable to doublecross Morriso 
The Superintendent of Finance did not choose to back down from 
the fight even though he had little chance of success. He initiated 
a desperate counterattack in the hope of reconciling the interests of 
the public creditors to the Bank and nation, Even though he opened 
up trade with the Orient which proved to be profitable, his enemies 
40Jensen, New Nation, PPo 262-265; Robert A. Rutland, The Ordeal 
of the Constitution (Norman, 1965), pp. 44-48. 
41John C, Miller, Alexander Hamilton: Portrait in Paradox (New 
York, 1959), Po 1460 
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in Pennsylvania were too strong, and Morris fell short of achieving 
his dreamo 
The deterioration of the Middle States business alliance, best 
illuminated by Forrest McDonald, has exposed a weakness in the argument 
of the Progressive historians, especially as it relates to the framing 
of the Constitutiono By 1787, no longer did there exist a unified 
front of merchants and creditors to whom an audacious core of nation-
alist politicians could appealo Instead, many mercantilist splinter 
groups within the nation and within the individual states were strug-
gling for ascendancy. For instance, in Pennsylvania, "the leadership 
and the organization of the Radical Party [the Antifederalists] was 
made up of merchants, public security holders, and lawyers, as was 
that of the Republican party [the Federalists] , 1142 According to the 
Beardian interpretation, the Radical Party should have been comprised 
of small farmers rather than influential merchants, and all holders 
of public security should have been among the Republicanso Conspiracy 
in the ranks of the public creditors, as Beard had suggested, simply 
cannot be found. Too often, as in Pennsylvania, the "investing" elites 
43 
were at odds among themselveso 
Even the complex issue of paper money is not an adequate index of 
the division between Federalists and Antifederalists in every case, 
Most proponents of the Constitution abhorred the paper-money schemes 
of state legislatures, Surprisingly, in South Carolina, it was the 
42 Forrest McDonald, We The People: The Economic Origins of the 
Constitution (Chicago, 1958), Po 169, 
43willi~m N. Chambers, Political Parties in~ New Nation, The 
American Experience, 1776-1809 (New York, 1963), Po 290 
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paper-money advocates who favored the Constitution and the public 
security holders who opposed it. 44 Since no general or universal eco-
nomic pattern emerges, one must assume that if the Constitution was a 
conservative document, its conservatism lay outside the realm of a 
single economic interest. 
The Progressive interpretation of the Constitution is further 
weakened by the supposition of a distinct division between the Feder-
alists and the Antifederalists. Actually, the polarization of the 
two hostile forces was somewhat exaggerated by Progressive historians, 
whose analysis does not account for a large group of Americans who 
were only mildly skeptical or in favor of the adoption of the Consti-
tution. Richard Henry Lee asserted the existence of "two very un-
principled parties in the United States--two fires, between which the 
honest and substantial people have long found themselves situated. 1145 
Even some of the most prominent Antifederalists were close to the 
Federalist viewpoint by 1787, In the Philadelphia Convention, the 
Antifederalist George Mason stated that "we all agree in the necessity 
of new regulations, but we differ widely in our opinions of what are 
46 the safest and most effectual." 
The Federalists did not possess one unified vision as to how to 
correct the deficiencies of the Articles, Believing that "too much 
attachment was betrayed to the State Governments" and that "a National 
44 McDonald, We The People, p. 235. 
45 R.H. Lee, "Letters from the Federal Farmer," in Paul L. Ford, 
ed., Pamphlets.£!!_ the Constitution of the United States (Brooklyn, 
1888) I P• 321, 
46 Farrand, ed., Records, I, p. 161, 
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G t t f 't 11 11 them up, 1147 G R d overnmen mus soon o necessi y swa ow a eorge ea 
desired supreme consolidation of the national government. At the op-
posite extreme, John Dickinson felt that "to attempt to abolish the 
States altogether would degrade the Councils of the Country, would be 
impracticable, would be ruinous. 1148 Considering what would be most 
acceptable to the people and the least likely to arouse violent oppo-
sition, the ardent nationalist James Wilson "saw no incompatibility 
between the national and the State Governments provided the latter 
49 
were restrained to certain local purposes." These varied opinions 
support the observation by Richard Morris that a wide gulf existed in 
the Federalist union "between the democratic nationalism of Franklin 
and the authoritarian nationalism of Hamilton. 1150 
The Antifederalists were more cautious in yielding power to the 
central government, for they genuinely feared the consequences of such 
an action. In the debates over the Constitution, the Antifederalists 
could argue that the new government was "dangerously adapted to the 
purposes of an immediate aristocratic tyranny" and that it "must soon 
terminate in the most uncontrouled despotism, 1151 but Antifederalists 
and Federalists were not two parties irrevocably separated on idea-
logical grounds, In the course of the debates, some noted Antifeder-
47Ibid., p. 136, 
48Ibid., p. 152. 
49 Ibid., p. 137. 
50Richard B. Morris, "The Confederation Period and the American 
Historian," The William and Mary Quarterly, XIII (April, 1956), p. 155. 
51Elbridge Gerry, "Observations on the New Constitution, and on the 
Federal and State Conventions," in Ford, ed., Pamphlets, p. 6. 
31 
alists, such as Samuel Adams and Melancton Smith, changed to the Fed-
eralist persuasion, Most dramatically, perhaps, the dynamic Federalist 
leader James Madison was to become a states-rightist advocate in the 
1790's. 
Actually, cleavages within the ranks of the two parties obstructed 
unified action and often overshadowed the line between Federalism and 
Antifederalism. A problem common to both sides, but most serious for 
the Federalists, was sectionalism, During the Confederation period 
tension between the North and the South plagued the operations of the 
Continental Congress and in 1786 threatened to divide the Union into 
"several regiona,l conferences. 1152 
As a part of the peace treaty with Great Britain, the United 
states had been given rights to free navigation of the Mississippi 
River. Since Spain controlled the territory west of the Mississippi, 
the Spanish government became alarmed as many American settlers began 
to pour into the regions of Kentucky and Tennessee, Afraid of the 
possibility of American expansion into Spanish territory, Spain decided 
to negotiate with the .United States on a commercial treaty, The result 
was the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations of 1786. 
Spain made an unusual offer to John Jay, Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs. Don Diego de.Gardoqui proposed that if the United States 
would give up its rights to the Mississippi River, then the United 
States would gain convenient trade with the West Indies and the Medi-
terranean area. Representing the interests of the Northeast, Jay was 
perfectly willing to enter into the bargain. However, in the Congress 
52McDonald, E Pluribus Unum, p. 145. 
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the Southern states joined together to block the East, and Jay was 
forced to abandon his negotiations" The possibility of continued 
southern expansion was at stake" Southerners of all persuasions were 
dismayed with .Jay's proposal because they realized that "the measure 
in question would be a voluntary barter in time of profound peace of 
the rights of one part of the empire to the interests of another 
53 part." Madison feared that tension between the two sections of the 
Confederation might prove fatal to the nationalist cause of augmenting 
central authority, and he wrote to Jefferson that Spain's chief object 
had been "to foment the jealousy between the eastern [New England] and 
54 
southern states"" Antifederalists, such as George Mason and William 
Grayson, predicted conspiracy on .the part of the Northeast to ruin 
55 Southern commerce" 
Not only were the two sections divided on commerce, but some 
statesmen doubted whether one code of laws could govern both New 
England and the South, An emphasis was placed on the cultural diver-
sity of the two sections, An Antifederalist in New England argued 
that "the inhabitants of warmer climates are more dissolute in their 
manners, and less industrious, than in colder countries" A degree of 
severity is, therefore, necessary with one which would cramp the 
53 James Madison to James Monroe, June 21, 1786, in Hunt, II, 
p. 254. 
54 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson~ August 12, 1786, in Julian 
Po Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton, 1954- ), 
x, p. 2330 
55George Mason, "Objections to the Federal Constitution," in 
Ford, ed", Pamphlets, p. 331; Elliot, III Po 293. 
spirit of the other, 1156 Also, Richard Henry Lee pointed out that 
the Eastern states are very democratic, and composed 
chiefly of moderate freeholders; they have but few rich 
men and no slaves; the Southern states are composed 
chiefly of rich planters and slaves; they have but few 
moderate freeholders, and the prevailing influence 
in them is generally a dissipated democracy. 57 
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The Antifederalists did their best to capitalize on sectional jealousy, 
but they failed to turn back the second nationalist thrust in their 
effort to keep the spirit of the Articles inta,ct. 
5611Agrippa IV," December 3, 1787, in Paul L. Ford, ed., Essays on 
the Constitution of the United States (Brooklyn, 1892), p, 64. 
57 R, H. Lee, "Letters from the Federal Farmer," in.Ford, ed., 
Pamphlets, p, 296, 
CHAPTER III 
THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE REBUTTAL AND THE 
SECOND NATIONALIST THRUST 
During the Progressive era in American historiography, a small 
but dedicated group of historians were writing their accounts from 
much the same viewpoint as the Nationalist historians of the century 
before, In the same year that Charles Beard was destined to influence 
the course.of American historiography with his presentation of eco-
nomic determinism, Max Farrand, author of The Framing of the Consti-
tution, attempted to defend the movement for the Constitution, To 
Farrand, the Constitution was an instrument designed to perfect the 
A-rticles, the first American experiment in constitutional government. 
Hence, the founding fathers were not guilty of radically departing 
from the Revolution because the changes they brought about in the 
Constitution were not foreign to the American political community. 
The nationalists simply invigorated the old powers of the Articles. 1 
Farrand looked upon the founding fathers as enlightened politicians 
who corrected a faulty system rather than as conservative conspirators, 
Like Farrand, Charles Warren praised the nationalists at a time 
when most historians were quite skeptical about the intentions of the 
nationalist leaders, Warren argued that the chief American statesmen 
1 Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution (New Haven, 1913), 
p. 208 0 
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were activated into reforming the Articles because they were afraid of 
"a dissoluti.on of the Union. 112 Certainly Madison held a great fear 
that the grave problems facing the Continental Congress might cause 
some kind of irreparable split and bring disaster upon the Union. 3 
Not all observers, however, were as gloomy as Madison about a possible 
division of the Union. David Ramsay, a contemporary historian of the 
Revolution, predicted to Jefferson that unless the Philadelphia Con-
vention formed 
an efficient federal government I fear that the end of 
the matter will be an American monarch or rather three 
or more confederacies. In either case we have not 
labored in vain in effecting the late revolution for 
such arrangements might be made as would secure our 
happiness.4 
Yet, for Charles Warren it was "the increasing number of men in the 
different States [who] were coming to believe in such a dismemberment 
5 
as the only solution for their political problems" that prompted him 
to see the nationalists as statesmen interested solely in the preser-
vation of their country. Saving the Union from sectional rivalry 
that would be the end result of any split could not be considered as 
a conspiracy, and Warren chided the Progressives for thinking entirely 
in economic terms. 
2 Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution (Boston, 1937), 
p. 9. 
3James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, February 24, 1787, in Hunt, 
II, p. 319: "The bulk of the people will probably prefer the lesser 
evil of a partition of the Union into three more practicable and ener~ 
getic Governments." 
4oavid Ramsay to Thomas Jefferson, April 7, 1787, in Boyd, XI, 
p. 279. 
5 Charles Warren, p. 26. 
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Both Farrand and Warren were swept aside at the time by the great 
torrent of Progressive writers, but their works were to emerge with 
importance during the 1950'so They would be accepted as early pio-
neers by a new school that would turn the debate on the Constitution 
full cycleo 
After the conclusion of World War II, a third school of historians, 
the Nee-Conservatives, appeared, travelling the old road but avoiding 
6 Beard's "well-worn ruto" Just as Beard and the Progressives had 
rescued constitutional scholarship from the realm of overly patriotic 
history, so did the Nee-Conservatives expand the debate into new di-
mensions untraveled by Progressive historianso Esmond Wright observed 
in 1961 that "the fashion today is to revere the Constitution almost 
as did Bancroft and Fiske. 117 Yet the Nee-Conservatives did more than 
just go back to the old Nationalist approach, They challenged the 
Progressive school on the idea of internal class conflict during the 
1780's and were to place their emphasis upon broad agreement. The 
Constitution became an extension of the great Revolutionary principles 
of 1776 and also a symbol of the enduring success of America's experi-
ment in independence. Whereas the Progressives had argued that the 
formation of the Constitution represented a conservative victory over 
democracy, the Nee-Conservative Dan Lacy countered the charge by 
saying that 
the Constitution .was in no sense a suppression of the 
democratic forces of the Revolution; rather it incor-
6 McDonald, We The People, p. v. 
7 Esmond Wright, The Fabric of Freedom, 1763-1800 (New York, 1961), 
p. 181. 
porated them in a final and brilliant resolution of 
those issues of central versus local ~overnment over 
which the Revolution had been fought, 
To the Nee-Conservatives, the founding fathers were genuinely 
concerned over the state of the nation, and the ideas of conspiracy 
37 
or forceful take-over "are melodramatic shadings contributed by super-
sensitive historians who have been ready to find conspiracy under 
every bed in every Philadelphia lodging house which was host to Con-
gressional delegates, merchants or financiers. 119 The Nee-Conservatives 
believed that a consensus had developed by 1787 that allowed the 
nationalists to make changes vital to the faltering system of govern-
ment. Since the nationalists wer~ working in behalf of the nation 
and the welfare of the people, they could not very easily have plotted 
against any one group. They acted boldly and without proper authori-
zation from the states, but the crisis of 1787, even if exaggerated 
for effect by nationalist politicians, required immediate reform. 
In the Nee-Conservative interpretation of the nationalist thrust, the 
nationalists were simply better politicians than their opponents, and 
they seized every opportunity to make the United States one nation in 
the face of localism and general indifference. The Nee-Conservatives 
intimated that the Federalists were able to carry their program of 
reform because, far from embarking upon a class war, they had support 
from all sections of the nation, 
In 1955 Louis Hartz challenged the idea of class conflict in 
8 Dan Lacy, The Meaning of the American Revolution (New York, 
1964), p. 267. 
9Richard B. Morris, The American Revolution Reconsidered (New 
York, 1967), p, 149. 
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American history in his book The Liberal Tradition in America. To 
Hartz, America had always been a liberal community, especially in com-
parison to European nations. During the colonial period in America 
feudalism had been absent, and as -a result no violent class struggles 
or rigid social structures had come about. The constitutional struggle 
of the Confederation period exhibited only a "shadow world of social 
conflict. 111° Federalists and Antifederalists could disagree over the 
nature of central government and yet still be able to share certain 
fundamental principles. The majority on both sides strongly advocated 
a republican form of government and would not even countenance the 
copying of the constitutional monarchy of Britain. Hartz charged the 
Progressives with an historical analysis that always "had an American 
hero available to match any American villain they found, a Jefferson 
for every Hamilton. 1111 Hartz's idea can be seen in the actions of 
two prominent Virginians. Edmund Randolph, an influential founding 
father from Virginia, vacillated frequently between Federalism and 
Antifederalism, and the wealthy Virginian, George Mason, who arrived 
at the Philadelphia Convention as a Federalist, refused to sign the 
Constitution and became an Antifederalist at the end. Were Randolph 
and Mason heroes or villains? With the Federalist "reaction" of 1787 
being minimized and the stress being laid upon the dynamics of a 
liberal society, Hartz established a sound theoretical base for the 
Nee-Conservative efforts to rescue the founding fathers from the hos-
10Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955), 
p. Bl. 
ll b'd I 1 , 1 p. 31. 
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tile influence of Progressive historians. 
Using the notion of consensus in history as their central theme, 
Nee-Conservative historians have tried to emphasize the comparative 
harmony that existed among the political leaders of the 1780's and thus 
have hoped to tone down the shady air of conspiracy pictured in the 
works of the Progressives. Indeed, leaders in both the Federal and 
Antifederal camps were veterans of the Revolution and had shared many 
common experiences. Unlike some of the unfortunate revolutionaries in 
Europe, none of the leaders of the American Revolution had been exe-
cuted for holding dissenting opinions or for being in the wrong party 
at the wrong time. Louis Hartz has suggested that since no segment 
of American society resembled the European ancien r~gime, it could 
12 
not very well "re.turn in a blaze of glory'' as had been the case 
with England and Charles II and as would be the case following the 
French Revolution. 
An argument can be advanced quite plausibly that the struggle 
over the Constitution brought to the nation a division far less sharp 
than the conflict over foreign policy in the 1790's. After all, the 
Federalists did not comprise the only voice advocating a stronger 
central government. By the mid-17BO's, many Antifederalists were just 
as convinced of the need for a more effective Articles as were their 
opponents. It was not entirely a struggle between two inflexible 
parties. Both sides showed willingness to compromise to a certain 
extent. The adoption of the Bill of Rights by the Federalists pro-
vides an excellent example, for it .was the issue that meant the most 
12Ibid., p. 7. 
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to the Antifederalists and the least to the Federalists. After Jef-
ferson had convinced Madison that "a bill of rights is what the people 
are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particu-
lar, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference, 1113 
the antagonism between the two parties largely disintegrated. Although 
the Virginia Antifederalist Richard Henry Lee held serious reserva-
tions about some features of the Constitution, he stated that if the 
ratifying conventions in the states, "after examining the system, 
adopt it, I shall be perfectly satisfied, and wish to see men make the 
administration of the government an equal blessing to all orders of 
14 
men." The notion of consensus and Lee's statement, as well as 
Forrest McDonald's demonstration of the lack of unified economic 
alignments, cast serious doubt upon the Progressive thesis of internal 
class conflict; however, the Nee-Conservatives have likewise failed 
to explain properly the tension in the Confederation period which cul-
minated in the Constitution. 
Before the Nee-Conservatives could advance the cause of consensus 
in history as had been developed by Louis Hartz, they had to discredit 
the Beardian approach. In fact, in the process several Neo-
Conservatives committed just as much muckraking as they accused Beard 
himself of doing. The assault on Beard and the Progressives has been 
merciless, yet it has failed to be totally convincing. 
In 1956 Robert E. Brown led the crusade against Beard and at-
13 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, December 20, 1787, in Boyd, 
XII, p. 440. 
14 R.H. Lee, "Letters from the Federal Farmer," in Ford, ed., 
Pamphlets, p. 322. 
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tempted to lift .the stature of the nationalists by arguing that they 
had much more than just economic motives in mind. They were men with 
principles as well as pocketbooks, Brown felt that nationalism and the 
fear of foreign domination "can.have.a much broader appeal than merely 
the economic, and especially to a people who have just emerged from 
the British empire. 1115 There is some evidence for such a view. As 
was to be expected, the new nation emerged from the War of Independence 
only to receive the contempt of the older European nations, and during 
the mid-1780's some nationalists were rather disappointed over the 
international stature of the United States. Quite unrealistically, 
they desired the United States to be on equal terms immediately with 
the other nations, and they argued over and over that the only solution 
was the creation of a powerful national government which could protect 
both the honor and the interests of the n~tion. Foreign problems, 
such as the British refusal to evacuate the Northwest forts and British 
espion~ge among the Northern Indian tribes, did provoke serious concern 
among some American statesmen; but to lay the stress upon this minor 
aspect is to depart from the fundamental constitutional conflict of 
central versus local government. 
In a most belligerent tone, Brown took issue with Beard's thesis 
that the conflict over the Constitution matched commercial interests 
against the lower classes _of society. Dismissing class conflict alto-
gether, Brown advanced the concept of a middle-class democracy which 
prevailed throughout America. Brown's belief jars with the account 
15 Robert E. Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution: A 
Critical Analysis of "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution" 
(Princ~ton, N. J., 1956), p. 93. 
of a contemporary observer of the Confederation period. Louis Otto 
had written to his superior, Count Vergennes, that 
although there are no nobles in America, there is a 
class of men denominated "gentlemen," who by reason of 
their wealth, their talents, their education, their 
families, or the offices they hold, aspire to a pre-
eminence which the people refuse to grant them.16 
Brown, like other Neo-Conservatives who were to follow, failed to 
account for this elite, and the picture of a perfect middle-class 
society becomes cloudy. 
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To Brown the Revolution extended political franchise to the 
majority of white adult males. 17 Since Brown conceived America as a 
liberal, middle-class democracy, he did not believe that the actions 
of the founding fathers constituted a conspiracy to benefit the 
wealthy segment of society at the expense of the people. All the 
interests in the country gained particular advantages out of the Con-
. t' 18 st1.tu ion. Brown transformed the Progressives' political cabal 
into a body of astute politicians. 
Only two years after Brown'.s devastating attack on Beard, Forrest 
McDonald reinforced the notion that Beard's thesis contained serious 
flaws. In a less severe and more constructive tone, McDonald argued 
that the formation of the Constitution did not result from the exis-
tence of consolidated economic interests. After much detailed re-
16Louis Otto to Count Vergennes, October 10, 1786, in Bancroft, 
II, pp. 399-400, 
17 Robert E, Brown, Middle-Class Democracy and the Revolution in 
Massachusetts (Ithaca, N. Y., 1955). Brown believed that in Massachu-
setts a middle-class democracy was already in existence before.the 
Revolution occurred. 
18 Robert E. Brown, Reinterpretation of the Formation of the Ameri-
can Constitution (Boston, 1963), p. 51, 
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search, McDonald discovered that the Constitution represented the 
work of a fair cross section of economic and political factions. In 
We The People, the founding fathers were not predominantly creditors 
and holders of public securities, nor did they struggle solely on 
behalf of those interestso Instead, the founding fathers were prac-
tical statesmen, not without faults, but certainly not conspirators 
in the sense the Progressives had suggested. 
Although the Nee-Conservative historians are fond of employ-
ing a re-assessment of the Beardian thesis as their point of depar-
ture, not all have stayed within the shadow of economic analysis. 
Some have focused their energies upon the myriad of forces that 
helped to shape the campaign for the Constitutiono In almost 
every account, the Federalist image is not blemished with the 
charge of a. "plot." Since a society without sharp social distinc-
tions has been envisioned by Nee-Conservatives, they concluded 
that the Federalists acted to conserve the liberal society already 
in existence. Some Nee-Conservatives have become so afflicted by 
the canons of consensual history that they have almost discounted 
the presence of the Antifederalists. 
Departing from the sharply penetrating economic analyses of 
Brown and McDonald, Benjamin F. Wright in Consensus and Continu-
ity concentrated upon linking the Constitution to the Declaration 
of Independence. Wright proposed that a high degree of under-
lying unity among various factions had characterized the advo-
cacy of the Constitution and argued that the framers of the 
Constitution possessed much the.same economic and social back-
ground as had the authors of the Declaration of Independence and 
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h . l 19 t e Artie es, After having gathered beneficial experience from 
their attendance in the Continental Congress, the nationalist leaders, 
such as Madison and Wilson, fashioned the Constitution out of politi-
cal concepts that were quite familiar to eighteenth-century America, 
They moved forward within well-defined bounds and, being political 
realists, did not strive for the perfection in the American document 
that plagued European revolutionaries in forming their constitutions, 
To Wright, the Philadelphia Convention was extremely successful be-
cause a spirit of compromise prevailed throughout the entire nation 
and the faun.ding fathers agreed upon basic principles which would 
not be distasteful to the common people. Political.extremists were 
either not in attendance or were voted down by the moderates, The 
radical Tom Paine, who certainly deserved a place in the Convention, 
was advancing the cause of liberty in Europe and could not attend, 
and Alexander Hamilton's "continental" plan was not even seriously 
considered by the delegates, The Constitution appeared to be neither 
radica.l nor reactionary. 
On the other hand, some Nee-Conservatives have gone so far as to 
insist that in 1787 the true radicals, in the best meaning of the term, 
were the Federalists rather than Antifederalists. The Federalists could 
be seen as bold innovators of a new and energetic political system, 
while. the Antifederalists could be cast as reactionaries who could not 
comprehend the idea of national interest. 20 Also, as Richard Morris 
19B ' ' ' h d ' ' 177 17 7 ( enJamin F. Wrig t, Consensus an Continuity, ~~6-~_8_ Boston, 
1958) I p, 46. 
20cecelia M. Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists 
on the Nature of Representative Government," The William and Mary 
Quarterly, XII (January, 1955), 
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pointed out, 
to those who view the adoption of a system of republican 
federalism as constituting a more thoroughgoing break 
with the political system of the past than did the earlier 
severing of the tenuous bonds of empire o , o the Feder-
a_lists, .not the Anti federalists, were the real radicals 
of their day,21 
However, in the literature and correspondence of the 1780's, the 
Federalists were always referred to as elitists or aristocratso They 
would have considered it as an insult to have been labeled radicalso 
In an article entitled "The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the 
Revolution," Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick presented a unique 
but somewhat absurd thesis concerning the establishment of the Con-
stitution, They argued that age was the key to the struggle between 
d 1 . d 'f d l' 22 Fe era 1sts an Anti e era 1stso The Federalists were younger than 
their opponents and were waiting to fully launch their careers upon 
the success of the Constitution, whereas the Antifederalists had 
enjoyed prominence during the 1770's. Being younger than the Anti-
federalists, the Federalists were far more energetic and thus con-
fident enough to make a bold strike at the decrepit Articles. Elkins 
and McKitrick believed that the Antifederalist caution and inertia 
stemmed from the fact that they had become too centered within their 
individual states. to see the necessity of.a strong national union, 
It is true that some were cautious because they could see through 
the exaggerated dangers in the political propaganda of their cen-
21Morris, "The Confederation Period and the American Historian," 
p. 156, 
22stanley M. Elkins and Eric McKitrick, "The Founding Fathers: 
Young Men of the Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVI 
(June, 1961), pp. 204-205. 
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23 tralist opponents. As the Antifederalist Melancton Smith noted, 
"we are at peace with .all the world; no nation menaces us with war; 
nor are we called upon by any cause of sufficient importance to 
attack any nationo 1124 Yet, since the Antifederalists never offered 
any strong plan as an alternative to the Constitution, Elkins and 
McKitrick concluded that "the energy principle may be more suggestive 
than the. principle of paternal conservatism. 1125 To view the founding 
fathers and the Antifederalists in this manner is to engage in fanci-
ful speculation rather than serious historical scholarship. 
A _much more illuminating approach to the complexities of the 
Confederation period is provided by John Roche. To Roche, the Con-
stitution was "a patchwork sewn together under the pressure of both. 
time and events by a group of extremely talented democratic politi-
cians.1126 Dangers to the Union, such as the collapse of the Conti-
nental Congress, were real, and the Philadelphia Covention therefore 
27 
served as "a nationalist reform caususo" Impressed by the amount 
of compromises that took place within the convention, Roche did not 
concede to the Progressives any element of class conflict. However, 
23 R, H. Lee, "Letters from the Federal Farmer," in Ford, edo, 
Pamphlets, PPo 280-282. 
24 1 . 0 h II dd h 1 f h t f Me ancton Smit, A ress tote Peep e o t e Sta e o New 
York," in Ford, ed o , Pamphlets, p. 95, 
25Elkins and McKitrick, p. 183, 
26 John P. Roche, "The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in 
Action," The American Political Science Review, LV (December, 1961), 
p. 815. 
27 Ibid., p. 799. 
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he did stress the nationalists' "masterful employment of political 
expertise [as against] the bumbling, erratic behavior 1128 of the 
opposition. The nationalists enjoyed ultimate success in the strug-
gle over ratification because they could effectively mobilize public 
opinion in their favor and the Antifederalists could not, Roche in-
dicated that the nationalists were very careful to stay within the 
bounds allowed by the consensus throughout the country. 
Continuing with the notion of consensus in history, Clinton 
Rossiter in The Grand Convention placed the founding fathers back 
upon nineteenth-century pedestals and claimed that the Philadelphia 
Convention was one of the greatest bodies ever assembled. At Phila-
delphia, the nationalists preserved liberty for the country and for 
future generations by creating a responsible government to meet the 
crisis of 1787, Following the dictates of consensual history, Ros-
siter asserted that "the Framers came together in 1787 just as most 
of them had gone to war in 1776: not to make the world over but to 
29 
make their corner of it secure," By painting the nationalist 
surge of 1787 in such roseate hues, Rossiter completely ignored the 
divisive events of the decade, Like Benjamin Wright, Rossiter failed 
to allow for the sincerity in the Antifederalists' accusation that 
the Constitution was a conspiracy to put an end to the precious 
liberties fought for in the Revolution. 
Departing from the general approach of most Neo-Conservatives, 
Richard Morris acknowledged some of the positive accomplishments made 
28 b'd 800 I 1 , , p. , 
29 l' . 1787 C 1nton Rossiter, : The Grand Convention (New York, 
1966), p. 270, 
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by the school of Progressive historianso However, he concluded that 
"the Constitution, which underwrote national survival, must be con-
sidered as an integral step in the revolutionary process. 1130 To 
Morris, the Constitution brought an end to the destructiveness of 
local jealousies and provided the nation with a viable government. 
The nationalists acted out of the desire to protect the international 
stature of the nationo The strict mercantilist policy of Britain 
that excluded the United States from the lucrative trade they had 
possessed in the British West Indies before the Revolution inflamed 
the nationalists' desire to erect a government that would be re-
spected by the European nations, especially Britain. In Morris' 
interpretation the nationalists were patriots first and were inter-
ested in economic gain only in so far as continued weakness in the 
central government would leave American commerce open "to the wanton 
intermeddlings of nations at war with each other. o o ,,31 
In 1965 Forrest McDonald caused a ripple to appear upon the calm 
sea of consensual history. After having laboriously refuted the 
Beardian thesis in We The People, he emerged as an historian closely 
akin to the Progressives in~ Pluribus Unum by picturing the Confed-
eration period as a conflict between republicans and nationalists, 
Yet whereas the republicans were heroes to Merrill Jensen, no politi-
cal statesmen, save several nationalists, were spared by McDonald in 
E Pluribus Unum. McDonald suggested that the majority of politicians 
on both sides were greedy and depraved and that they were motivated 
30Morris, American Revolution Reconsidered, Po 162. 
31The Federalist, No. llo 
by intrigue and profit. Only a few were "giants in the earth [who 
truly] spoke in the name of the nation. 1132 Most grasped for power 
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and financial success and would either support or oppose the Consti-
tution according to how that document would affect their economic 
status. 33 Like the individuals involved in the constitutional strug-
gle, the states as political units favored the Constitution if they 
had fared badly during the Confederation period and if they needed 
some kind of aid, Large states, such as Virginia and New York, which 
could prosper with or without the Union, were hotbeds of Antifeder-
al ism, 
In the preface to E Pluribus Unum Forrest McDonald explained his 
intention to depart from dull historical writing, 34 and he was most 
successful in unfolding an exciting drama dominated by undercover 
dealings and crafty manipulations of the politicians of that period. 
During the War for Independence, McDonald declared that the many local 
factions throughout the country coalesced to carry the conflict to a 
successful end but then began to split apart with the signing of 
peace in 1783. In describing the events which followed, McDonald 
traveled a middle course between the Progressives and the old Nation-
alist school, He affirmed Merrill Jensen's belief that economic 
conditions were healthy throughout the Union, but he proceeded to 
show how it was precisely these healthy conditions that endangered 
32 McDonald, E Pluribus Unum, p. 236, 
33 Ibid., p. 199. 
34Ibid., p. x111. McDonald cites his own earlier work, We The 
People, as a prime example of dull writing. 
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the Union. After 1783 most of the states had launched a successful 
program of adjusting to independence from the British empire. How-
ever, as the states began to absorb more and more of the Revolutionary 
debt, the bonds of union were considerably weakened. Politicians 
became more attached to their own states than to the idea of the 
Union, and as a result the Continental Congress collapsed. 
To McDonald, "it was the Critical Period of American History 
only to those who thought that the American Republic was worth cre-
ating and saving. 1135 It was also a critical period for the Antifed-
eralists, although few historians have cared to acknowledge that 
fact. The Antifederalists were genuinely convinced that between 1785 
and 1789 the Federalists had purposely led the people astray and 
"have Loaded them with unnecessary Burthens, to obtain which they 
have turned a Convention into a Conspiracy, and under the Epiteth 
Federal have destroyed the Confederation. 1136 Certainly the second 
nationalist onslaught appeared menacing to the Antifederalist con-
ception of the American Revolution. However, it seems that the 
Federalists did not have to resort to conspiracy. Due to a series 
of brilliant political strokes, the Federalists had lawfully out-
maneuvered their opponents by 1789. 
The resignation in 1784 of Robert Morris as Superintendent of 
Finance and the decline of the business coalition in the Middle 
States did not end all attempts to strengthen the central govern-
ment. An advanced core of nationalists, including James Madison, 
35 b'd 154 I 1 ., p. . 
36 Lynd, p. 244. 
51 
James Wilson, Robert Morris, Gouverneur Morris, Alexander Hamilton, 
George Washington, Charles Pinckney, George Read, and Nathaniel Gorham, 
hoped to capitalize upon yet another scheme entirely outside of Con-
gress, and it was the success of an interstate meeting, the Mount 
Vernon Conference, that gave the nationalists new hope. Although the 
Mount Vernon Conference involved only the two states Virginia and 
Maryland, Madison quickly perceived that this kind of convention 
could be expanded to include all the states. At this point Madison 
became the leader of "a loose but effective association of like-
37 
minded leaderso" Working through the Virginia legislature, Madi-
son issued a call for a convention to be held at Annapolis in order 
to discuss the commercial problems of the new nation. According to 
the French foreign observer, the nationalists hoped to use commerce 
as a ploy when their real intention was a complete overhaul of the 
t . l 38 Ar ices. However, Madison indicated the impossibility of such 
a task to Jefferson. 
Many gentlemen, both within and without Congress [wrote 
Madison] wish to make this meeting subservient to a 
plenipotentiary Convention for amending the Confederation. 
Tho' my wishes are in favor of such an event, yet I 
despair so much of its accomplishment at the present 
crisis that I do not extend my views beyond commercial 
reform. 39 
From the outset some Northern merchants deeply distrusted the 
37 Lacy, p. 242. 
38Louis Otto to.Count Vergennes, October 10, 1786, in Bancroft, 
II, p. 400. Otto informed Vergennes that the authors of the Annapolis 
Convention did not truly care about commerce but possessed secret 
motives that the people were not aware ofo 
39James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, August 12, 1786, in Boyd, 
x, p. 233. 
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motives behind the call for the Annapolis Convention, In a letter to 
Jonathan Jackson, Rufus King wrote that "it is doubtful what the real 
40 
sentiments of Virginia are on the question of commercial powers." 
Although the North was greatly interested in granting more commercial 
control to Congress, Northern politicians desired to affect change 
through Congress rather than through a special convention, Some be-
lieved that the nationalists harbored a design to subvert the basic 
form of the Articles at Annapolis. 41 
Regardless of the nationalist intentions before.Annapolis, once 
delegates from the states began to arrive the nationalists were forced 
to change their tactics. After the first two weeks of the convention 
only five states were fully represented, and even a commercial agree-
ment appeared hopeless. However, the lack of a quorum to conduct the 
business of the convention did not prevent the nationalists from 
taking direct action. They realized that a quick adjournment of the 
Annapolis Convention upon the excuse of such a small representation 
of the states would allow them to call for another general convention, 
Forrest McDonald has suggested that "those in attendance had no in-
42 tention of allowing a quorum to become present," The nationalists 
did not desire to make any drastic proposals on a failing convention, 
40Rufus King to Jonathan Jackson, June 11, 1786, in Burnett, 
VIII, pp. 389-390. 
41Theodore Sedgwick to Caleb Strong, August 6, 1786, ibid,, p. 
415: "The measure was originally brought forward with an intention 
of defeating the enlargement of the powers of Congress." 
42McDonald, ~ Pluribus Unum, p. 147, See also Edmunds. Morgan, 
The Birth of the Republic, 1763-1789 (Chicago, 1956), p. 130; Robert 
L. Schuyler, The Constitution of the United States (New York, 1928), 
p. 69; Linda G. De Pauw, The Eleventh Pillar (New York, 1966), p. 47, 
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Also, they knew that if a satisfactory commercial solution were found 
at Annapolis then the impetus to reshape the Articles would be lessened 
considerablyo 
At Annapolis, Alexander Hamilton moved that another convention be 
called to discuss all the problems confronting the nation. Hamilton 
did not have instructions from the New York legislature for such a 
proposal, but fortunately for Hamilton and Madison the commission 
from New Jersey did not have binding instructions as did the 
rest of the delegates. Therefore, it was pre-arranged among avid 
nationalists that Abraham Clark of New Jersey should introduce the 
resolution for a general convention to be held in Philadelphia in 
43 May, 1787. Hamilton was selected to write an address to the 
states, and in the first draft he called for the abolition of the 
Articles. However, from the experience of bitter defeat in the 
centralist push of the early 1780's, Madison wisely toned down the 
address to empower the delegates to make only those changes deemed 
necessary to correct the ills of the nation. 44 Not wanting to fright-
en the state legislatures into rejecting the Annapolis proposal, he 
did not indicate precisely what dangers the nationalists hoped to 
45 
remedy. They were able to guide public opinion more effectively 
43 
'11 310 Mi er, p. . 
44Elliot, I, p. 120: "It is expedient that, on the second Monday 
in May next, a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed 
by the several states, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and ex-
press purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation." 
45 rbid., p" 118: "Your commissioners decline an enumeration of 
those national circumstances on which their opinion respecting the pro-
priety of a future convention, with more enlarged powers is founded" 
• " . They are of a nature so serious, as, in the view of your commis-
sioners, to render the situation of the United States delicate and 
critical." 
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by not disclosing their true intentions beforehando They appeared as 
concerned patriots and thus veiled their design of counterrevolution 
until it was too late for the Antifederalists to fight back successfully. 
As a result of their earlier failure under Robert Morris, the 
nationalists had become most concerned with the use of proper tactics. 
It is not surprising that they grasped the more popular term "Feder-
alist" for themselves even though it very clearly contradicted their 
true beliefs. Esmond Wright believed that "in nothing were they so 
skillful as in the name they chose, for their intention was unitary 
' 46 
rather than federalo" Therefore, opponents of the nationalists be-
came Antifederalists and were accused unjustly of being unpatriotic 
and unfriendly to any strengthening of the Confederation. It was 
difficult enough to oppose the great and influential men within the 
Federalist party, but the slur of the bad name that had been attached 
to the Antifederalists made their task nearly impossible. 
During the months before the Philadelphia Convention, eager 
nationalists were primarily concerned with developing the necessary 
support to make the upcoming convention a success. The advanced core 
of nationalists realized that they needed a catalyst to unite firmly 
their diverse ranks. Public opinion would have to be moulded toward 
the dire necessity of a powerful central authority. The first nation-
alist thrust had become too dependent upon business connections and 
had failed when local jealousies reasserted themselves. Not wishing 
to repeat previous mistakes, the nationalists hoped to make local 
business alliances dependent upon their plan. They could achieve this 
46Esmond Wright, Po 176. 
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goal by exaggerating the economic plight of the country, a tactic that 
had proved fairly successful in the years of the Morris junta. Yet 
they realized that the economic avenue to reform would not be enough, 
Fortunately for the proponents of a strong central government, a 
catalyst was soon to take shape in the form of Shays Rebellion. This 
small rebellion in Massachusetts furnished the nationalists with enough 
propaganda to unite the conservative ranks of society, to overturn the 
Confederation, and to establish the kind of government that would be 
capable of protecting the property and rights of individuals from 
mob despotism. 
Contrary to what was to become the general interpretation of the 
rebellion by top political leaders, the disturbance in Massachusetts 
did not constitute a serious threat to national security, nor was it 
an attempt on the part of visionary radicals to level society through-
out the nation. Of course, in the effort to rally their forces 
against the impending disaster to the Union, the nationalists promoted 
th . . 47 is image. However, Shays Rebellion was a mild response by yeomen 
farmers in western Massachusetts to high taxes and debts. The politi-
cal aristocracy unfairly misrepresented the rebellion so that the 
evils which they believed had plagued the Confederation could be cor-
48 
rected. In The Antifederalists Jackson T. Main hinted that the 
47 George Washington to David Humphreys, December 26, 1786, in 
Jared Sparks, ed., The Writings of George Washington {Boston, 1839), 
IX, p. 221: "It was but the other day that we were shedding our blood 
to obtain the constitutions under which we now live; constitutions of 
our own choice and making; and now we are unsheathing the sword to 
overturn them." 
48Joseph P. Warren, "The Confederation and Shays Rebellion," 
American Historical Review, XI (1905-06), p. 42. 
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conservatives may have been responsible for goading the Shaysites into 
action in order to convince political leaders throughout the Union that 
49 
some kind of reactionary response was necessary. Although it may be 
unclear as to who actually provoked the Shaysites into taking arms, 
Shays' contumacy had a profound effect upon the diverse ranks within 
the Federalist party. E. James Ferguson has declared that "the fear 
of social radicalism drove New England merchants and southern planters 
into alignment with middle state conservatives in support of the move-
t f h O t' ,,50 men or t e Constitu ion. However, by 1787, the nationalists were 
not alone in advocating a strengthening of the central government be-
cause some Antifederalists were willing to concede power for a specific 
length of time to the Confederation Congress in the form of amendments 
to the Articles. Both sides saw the need for some kind of an improve-
ment in the present state of the Articles, but they were radically 
divided as to the form of the cure. 
The advanced core of nationalists did not want simply to add 
51 
amendments to what they considered a poor framework of government, 
Madison intimated to his close circle of nationalist friends that "the 
52 Present System neither has nor deserves advocates." The nationalists 
49Main, Antifederalists, p. 64. 
50 Ferguson, p. 250. 
51 George Washington to David Stuart, November 19, 1786, in Ban-
croft, II, p, 404: "However delicate the revision of the federal sys-
tem may appear, it is a work of indispensable necessity. The present 
constitution is inadequate; the superstructure is tottering to its 
foundations, and without helps will bury us in its ruins." 
52 James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, February 24, 1787, in Hunt, 
II, p. 318. 
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wanted to begin outside the framework of the Articles and to fashion 
the kind of government that they had almost succeeded in establishing 
before the signing of peace with Great Britain" In addition, exper-
ience with the Impost requests of 1781, 1783 and 1786 had taught them 
how difficult it was to amend the Articles. Bypassing methods to 
amend legally the Articles, most of the nationalists placed their faith 
in the Philadelphia Convention, although not all were convinced until 
Shays Rebellion had run its course. 53 
Several months before the convention opened, Madison experi-
mented with the idea of a new constitution" In a letter to Edmund 
Randolph Madison said: "My ideas of a reform strike so deeply at 
the old Confederation, and lead to such a systematic change, that they 
scarcely admit of the expediento 1154 Madison desired to end what he 
perceived as the democratic vices of state legislatures by granting 
the central authority a negative over all state laws" He believed 
that only through a grant of such power to the national Congress 
could the worthy citizens of the nation be protected from the wicked 
and licentious" Of course, the group that feared the wickedness 
the most during the 1780's was the elite to which the advanced core 
of nationalists belonged. Not only had they been hurt in both pri-
vate and public affairs, but some had been pushed out of state legis-
53Rufus King to John Adams, October 2, 1786, in Burnett, VIII, 
p. 475: "Congress can do all a convention Ccin." King changed his 
mind after Shays Rebellion shook his state. 
54 James Madison to Edmund Randolph, April 8, 1787, in Hunt, 
II, p. 337. 
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55 latures by the "rabble" of society. As a general rule, the state 
legislatures had not observed the sanctity of contracts and debts, 
and most legislation tended to favor debtors over creditors. 
The nationalists were further alarmed by the tendency for all 
functions of government to gravitate toward the legislature. Without 
an able national executive and a strong judicial system to check the 
abuses of legislative power, the state legislatures wielded too much 
power in the opinion of the nationalist elite. Gouverneur Morris 
warned that "public liberty [was] in greater danger from Legislative 
56 
usurpations than from any other source." Under the conviction that 
they could not possibly amend the Articles in any satisfactory man-
ner, the nationalists believed that their only alternative to remove 
excessive power from the state legislatures was in the formation of 
a new constitution. 
Wherever the real power in a government lies [explained 
Madison] there is the danger of oppression. In our 
Governments the real power lies in the majority of the 
Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly 
to be apprehended, not from acts of government contrary 
to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which 
the Government is the mere instrument of the major num-
ber of the constituents.57 
By placing sovereignty in the central government, the nationalists 
knew they could regain their rightful places in the government while 
55John Jay to Alexander Hamilton, May 8, 1778, in Syrett and 
Cooke, I, p. 483: "Effrontery and arrogance, even in our virtuous 
and enlightened days are giving rank and importance to men whom 
Wisdom would have left in obscurity." 
56 Farrand, ed., Records, II, p. 76. 
57 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1788, in Boyd, 
XIV, p. 19. 
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putting an end to the egalitarian democracy of the Revolution that had 
nearly destroyed the governing power of the elite. 
Since 1780 Hamilton had been an advocate of a new framework of 
government, and he supported Madison's view in holding that the evils 
of the Confederation were not "caused from minute or partial imperfec-
tions, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, 
which cannot be amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first 
principles and main pillars of the fabric. 1158 The advanced core of 
nationalists planned to discard the principle of state sovereignty 
once they were safely inside the Philadelphia Convention, and they 
did not hesitate to use all their power and influence to achieve 
their dream of erecting a powerful central government. 
In the effort to reshape the American government, the influence 
of Washington, the symbol of national unity during the war with 
Britain, was one of the. most effective weapons that the nationalists 
possessed. They realized that Washington's emergence from private 
life to the service of the country had to be carefully planned. 
Washington's presence at the Philadelphia Convention could mean the 
difference between success and failure as long as the states were 
adequately represented. However, after the poor attendance at Annap-
olis, nationalists were not certain of what to expect at Philadelphia, 
and they did not want to ruin the impact of his emergence from retire-
ment upon a failing convention. Washington stated his own intentions 
by saying that he "should not like to be a sharer in this business 
[unless] the delegates come with such powers as will enable the con-
58The Federalist, No. 15. 
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vention to probe the defects of the constitution to the bottom. 1159 
After a long period of hesitation, Washington decided that it was ab-
solutely essential that he attend. The uncertain years between 1783 
and 1787 had fully convinced Washington and other nationalists that 
"thirteen sovereignties pulling against each other and all tugging 
at the federal head will soon bring ruin on the whole. .,60 
Washington's presence at the Philadelphia Convention assured the 
61 
nationalists of a fair chance of success. 
While the nationalists were busily preparing for the Philadelphia 
Convention, prominent Antifederalists were refusing to attend. 
Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee turned down invi-
tations to attend, and as a result the views of the Antifederalists 
were poorly represented. After the convention was over, Richard 
Henry Lee lamented the absence of the Antifederalists by concluding 
that "had they attended, I am pretty clear that the result of the con-
vention would not have been that strong tendency to aristocracy now 
62 discernable in every part of the plan." 
The prospect of the Antifederalists staying away from the con-
59George Washington to Henry Knox, April 2, 1787, in John c. 
Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington (Washington, 
1939), XXIX, p. 194. 
60George Washington to James Madison, November 5, 1786, in 
Sparks, IX, p. 208. 
61James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, July 12, 1788, in Boyd, 
XIII, p. 352. Remarking upon the adoption of the Constitution, the 
Antifederalist James Monroe stated" ••. be assured his influence 
carried this government." 
62 R.H. Lee, "Letters from the Federal Farmer," in Ford, ed., 
Pamphlets, p. 285. 
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vention allowed the nationalists to act boldly from the outset. Even 
before a quorum had been reached, delegates from Virginia and Pennsyl-
vania met daily to discuss the approach they hoped to take just as 
soon as enough states had arrived. These meetings proved to be most 
important, for it was decided that Edmund Randolph should introduce 
a plan for a.truly national government. This plan provided the basis 
for the new government that appeared in the Constitution at the end 
of the convention. "Instead of being thirteen republics, under a 
federal head," observed Richard Henry Lee, "it is clearly designed to 
63 
make us one consolidated government." In a letter to Richard Henry 
Lee Sam Adams also adequately expressed the despair of the Antifeder-
alists in the following: "I stumble at the Threshold. I meet with 
a National Government, instead of a Federal Union of Sovereign 
64 States." The Antifederalists were shocked that the nationalists 
had disobeyed their instructions and thereby had openly violated one 
of the cardinal principles of republican government. 
While the Philadelphia Convention debated in secrecy over a new 
form of government during the summer of 1787, most people who cared 
about politics and the state of the Union simply assumed that the 
delegates were at work upon amendments to the Articles. They did 
not know that in the early phase of the Convention the delegates 
had decided to dispose of the Articles and to begin anew with the 
presentation of Madison's and Randolph's Virginia Plan. The Phila-
63Ibid., p. 282. 
64 Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, December 3, 1787, in Harry 
A. Cushing, ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams (New York, 1908), IV, 
p. 324. 
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delphia Convention had not been authorized to take such action. In 
giving its halfhearted approval to the convention on February 21, 
1787, the Continental Congress had made the narrow boundaries of re-
form quite clear. The nationalists had acted without the legal ap-
proval of Congress or the states. Also, the people did not know that 
the two powerful forces of consolidation and state supremacy had 
collided in midsummer and had resolved themselves into a partly na-
tional, partly federal government. They saw only the final product, 
a new structure of government that did not resemble the Articles. 
Some charged it as a "many headed monster; of such motley mixture, 
that its enemies cannot trace a feature of Democratick or Republi-
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can extract." Others hailed it as "an improvement on the best 
contitutions that the world ever saw. 1166 
Even before the Philadelphia Convention adjourned and the Con-
stitution was presented to the state legislatures, some ardent 
nationalists voiced discontent over their accomplishment. They 
had hoped to empower the new government with a legislative negative 
over all state laws, but they had to settle for judicial review. 
Believing that judicial review would not provide a firm enough 
check upon the state legislatures, James Wilson argued that it· 
would be "better to prevent the passage of an improper law than to 
67 declare it void when passed." Agreeing with Wilson, Madison 
65Elbridge Gerry, "Observations on the New Constitution, and on 
the Federal and State Conventions," in Ford, ed., Pamphlets, p. 8. 
66Noah Webster, "An Examination into the leading principles of 
the Federal Constitution," ibid., p. 64. 
67 
Farrand, ed., Records, II, p. 391. 
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believed that a legislative negative was essential to the success of 
a strong national government, He lamented that 
the plan [the Constitution], should it be adopted, will 
neither effectually answer its national object, not [sic] 
prevent the local mischiefs which everywhere excite dis-
gusts against the State Governments.68 
Even though the nationalists were dissatisfied with some aspects of 
the Constitution, they acknowledged Hamilton's insight when he con-
fessed that "no man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his 
own were known to be; but is it possible to deliberate between anar-
chy and Convulsion on one side, and the chance of good to be expected 
69 from the plan on the other?" When the Constitution was ready to be 
presented to the states, the nationalists had controverted Jefferson's 
belief that "with all the imperfections of our present government 
[the Articles] it is without comparison the best existing or that 
ever did exist, 1170 They believed that they had created a government 
that would be more than just an assembly of debate. 
In transforming a weak Continental Congress into a new struc-
ture, the nationalists not only had insisted upon secrecy in the 
Philadelphia Convention but also did not hesitate to approve the use 
of shady tactics in some of the ratifying conventions. To the nation-
alists of 1787, as had been the case with most of the same men in 
1783, their goal clearly justified whatever strategy they cared to 
employ, The nationalists appeared as conspirators in the Antifed-
68Ibid., III, p. 77, 
69 Ibid,, II, pp, 645-46. 
70 Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington, August 4, 1787, in 
Boyd, XI, p. 678. 
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eralist criticism of the Constitution, and in Pennsylvania "the pro-
ceedings connected with the ratification of the Constitution were 
71 
conducted with unseemly haste." 
When the Pennsylvania legislature received the Constitution in 
September, the majority of delegates (dominated at the time by con-
servatives) favored its acceptance. Realizing that the Constitution 
would probably encounter stiff opposition from the general populace, 
the Federalists desired a ratifying convention to be called quickly 
before the people, especially those farthest removed from the city of 
Philadelphia, had a sufficient amount of time to read and study the 
Constitution. The minority of legislators who opposed the Constitu-
tion argued against the Federalist measure because their constituents 
were not acquainted with the document. Their valid request for a 
postponement of the ratifying convention could not make any headway 
against the Federalists who controlled the legislature. Thus, in 
order to prevent a quorum that was necessary to issue the call for 
a convention, the Antifederalists left the state legislature, only 
to be "seized the next day by a mob collected for that purpose, and 
forcibly dragged to the house, and there detained by force whilst 
the quorum of the legislature so formed, completed their resolution. 1172 
The Federalists had not hesitated to use the terror of mob politics 
in support of their cause. 
71 Beard, p. 238. 
72 
"The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Con-
vention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents," in John 
Bach McMaster and Frederick D. Stone, eds., Pennsylvania and the 
Federal Constitution (New York, 1970), II, p. 458. 
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In most of the states the Federalists did not resort. to this 
Pennsylvania brand of violenceo As Madison remarked to Edmund Pendle-
ton, "the weight of abilities and property is on the side of the Con-
O t' .. 73 st1.tu 1.on. That the Antifederalists offered the kind of resistance 
they did to a powerful elite, which included the intellectual giants 
Madison, Wilson and Hamilton, as well as the awesome, majestic pres-
ence of Washington, was truly remarkableo Gordon Wood observed in 
his book The Creation of the American Republic that "the Antifeder-
alists were not so much beaten as overawed [because they] were poli-
ticians without influence and connections and ultimately politicians 
without social and intellectual confidence. 1174 The "continental" 
experience of the Federalists paid off handsomely in the ratification 
struggle. With their wealth and influence, the Federalists were able 
to silence their opponents in many cases through simply withdrawing 
their subscriptions to newspapers advocating the Antifederalist 
75 
causeo 
In the arts of debate the Federalists proved to be invincible. 
For instance, the Antifederalists sharply criticized the Federalists 
for demanding immediate adoption without the necessary time to debate 
the merits of the Constitution, "If we remain cool and temperate," 
contended Richard Henry Lee, "we are in no immediate danger of any 
73 James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, February 21, 1788, in Hunt, 
v I P• 109 • 
74 Wood, pp. 486-87. 
75 Ibid. Also, Wood pointed to the fact that "out of a hundred 
or more newspapers printed in the late eighties only a dozen sup-
ported the Antifederalists." 
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commotions; we are in a state of perfect peace, and in no danger of 
invasions. 1176 The Antifederalists believed that only through much 
investigation could all the serious defects be found which would con-
vince the people to reject the Constitution, In response to that 
charge, the Federalists wisely replied that 
if mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution 
of government until every part of it had been adjusted 
to the most exact standard of perfection, society 
would soon become a general scene of anarchy, and the 
world a desert.77 
By falling back upon their propaganda of the 1780's the Federalists 
were able to defeat a solid claim by the Antifederalists. 
Cut off from many newspapers that would have given their case a 
fair hearing and a better chance to prevail, the Antifederalists waged 
a grim battle that they had little chance of winning, Determined to 
check "the magnificent designs of the well-born, a government where 
78 tyranny may glut its vengeance on the low-born," the Antifederalists 
struggled against their superior opponents in the conviction that 
"the federal Convention ought to have amended the old system; for this 
purpose.they were solely delegated; the object of their mission ex-
d d th 'd O ,,79 ten e to no o er cons1 erat1on. As was pointed out by John 
Burgess, author of Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, 
what they [the Philadelphia Convention] actually did, 
stripped of all fiction and verbiage, was to assume 
76 R. H. Lee, "Letters from the Federal Farmer," in Ford, ed., 
Pamphlets, pp. 280-81. 
77The Federalist, No, 65, 
78centinel No. III, in McMaster and Stone, II, p. 595. 
79Elliot, III, p, 23, 
constituent powers, ordain a constitution of government 
and of liberty, and demand a plebiscite thereon over the 
heads of all existing legally organized powers. Had 
Julius or Napoleon committed these acts they would have 
been pronounced coups d'etats"80 
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The Antifederalists understood the nature of the Federalist overthrow 
of the Articles, but they never could mount enough momentum to pin 
completely the charge of conspiracy upon the well-respected Federalist 
elite. However, Samuel Adams was correct when he perceived that "the 
81 few haughty Families, think They must govern." 
80 h l' . 1 . d O O • 1 Jon Burgess, Po itica Science~ Comparative Constitutiona 
Law (New York, 1890), I, p. 105. 
81 Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, December 3, 1787, in 
Cushing, IV, p. 325. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Progressive historians have approached the political confron-
tation of the 17BO's from varying angles, but they have always arrived 
at the same conclusion. In attempting to invest the national govern-
ment with sovereignty over the states and to transform the Congress 
from an impotent assembly of state delegates into an energetic Ameri-
can legislature, the nationalists conspired against the democratic 
forces of the Revolution, defined as freedom from centralized authority. 
Contrary to the position taken by the school of Nee-Conservatives, the 
Progressives have been correct to stress the element of subversion 
even though they have not been able to demonstrate convincingly a 
conspiracy. The Federalists discarded the Articles in the interests 
of their aristocratic elite first and of the people secondly, with 
the full knowledge that although the people were incapable of wisely 
governing themselves republican government had to be based upon the 
will of the people. Furthermore, as Gordon Wood has stated 
for all its emphasis on equality, republicanism was still 
not considered by most to be incompatible with the con-
ception of a hierarchical society of different gradations 
and a unitary authorit1 to which deference from lower to 
higher should be paid. 
Thus, for strategic reasons, the Federalists bypassed the state legis-
1 Wood, p. 479. 
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latures, which were not likely to give approval to their own death 
warrants, and submitted the Constitution to popularly elected conven-
tions. Although this Federalist scheme subverted the authority lodged 
in the thirteen state legislatures by the Articles, it does not sig-
nify conspiracy against the democratic forces of the Revolution. 
Instead, it was simply a brilliant political stroke on the part of 
the Federalists. "It is of great importance," contended Edmund Ran-
dolph at the Philadelphia Convention, "that the consideration of this 
subject should be transferred from the legislatures where this class 
of men [local demagogues] have their full influence to a field in 
which their e:l;:forts can be less mischievous. 112 Randolph knew that 
the Antifederalists commanded much strength in the local legislatures 
and vastly outnumbered men of the Federal persuasion. Also, the 
Federalists indicated a fear that the legislatures would be "inter-
rupted with a variety of little business; by artfully pressing which, 
designing men will find means to delay from year to year, if not to 
3 frustrate altogether, the national system." In An Economic Inter-
pretation of the Constitution, Charles Beard maintained that the 
Federalists desired separate conventions out of the realization 
that "there was a better chance of getting the right kind of citizens 
elected to a convention than to a legislature. 114 By employing their 
prestige, Federalist propagandists influenced the people into electing 
nationalist-minded delegat~s and thus assured the way for ratification. 
2 Farrand, ed., Records, II, p. 89. 
3Ibid., p. 90. 
4 ' 
Beard, p. 221. 
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Not only did the Federalists keep the Constitution out of the 
grasp of hostile state legislatures, but they also determined that the 
Constitution would replace the Articles just as soon as nine states 
ratified. Under the Articles, changes could be adopted only with the 
full consent of all the states, but the Federalists did not want to 
take any chances with the Constitution. They could pressure the 
recalcitrant states as soon as they had the full support of nine. 
Surprisingly, the Antifederalists did not take advantage of drama-
tizing this particular Federalist subversion. Even Madison admitted 
that the convention had "departed from the tenor of their commission 115 
in insisting upon ratification by only nine of the thirteen states. 
In their difficult endeavor to thwart the Federalist "reform," 
the Antifederalists believed that their best opportunity hinged upon 
their ability to illustrate the evils of concentrated power which 
they felt were embodied in the Constitution. Persuasive orators, 
such as Patrick Henry, appealed to veterans of the Revolution to 
recall the intense struggle for freedom against a distant centralized 
authority. The New York Antifederalist Melancton Smith predicted 
that the Constitution would create "a government of oppression [which 
would] fall into the hands of the few and the great. 116 Likewise, 
Elbridge Gerry, a founding father at Philadelphia who had refused 
to sign the Constitution, charged that nationalists had embarked 
upon a course "marked on one side with the dark, secret and profound 
intrigues of the statesmen long practised in purlieus of despotism; 
5The Federalist, No. 40. 
6Elliot, II, p. 247. 
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and on the other, with the ideal projects of young arnbition. 117 The 
Antifederalists saw that the Constitution had been fashioned by three 
of the same politicians who would have used military force in 1783 to 
cement the bonds of union. The picture of a distant and oppressive 
government staffed by aristocrats, such as Robert Morris, who would 
not be responsive to the needs of the common man was undeniably 
frightening to Antifederalists. In the Massachusetts ratifying con-
vention, one Antifederalist remarked suspiciously: 
These lawyers, and men of learning and moneyed men, 
that talk so finely, and gloss over matters so 
smoothly, to make us poor illit~rate people swal-
low down the pill, expect to get into Congress 
themselves; they expect to be the managers of this 
Constitution, and get all the power and all the 
money into their own hands, and then they will 
swallow all us little folks like the great Levia-
than; yes just as the whale swallowed up Jonah! 8 
In courageously expressing their apprehensions in defiance of the 
skillful assurances made by Federalist leaders, the Antifederalists 
were not wanting in faith, nor were they solely political pessimists 
blocking the way toward national unity. 9 Instead, they entertained 
a belief that they had discovered a plot taking form as a result of 
the tensions caused by the new nation's adaptation to independence 
from Britain, and they fervently resolved to inform the people of 
7Elbridge Gerry, "Observations on the New Constitution, and on the 
Federal and State Conventions," in Ford, ed., Pamphlets, p. 7. 
8Elliot, II, p. 102. 
9 Robert Rutland in his book The Ordeal of the Constitution 
disagrees with Cecelia Kenyon's contention that the Antifederalists 
were "men of little faith." To Rutland, the Antifederalists did 
have a positive program of reform, but the leaders simply could 
not unify the diversity in their ranks. 
this conspiracy before it was too late. They further warned that 
the same men who now cry up the necessity of an ener-
getic government, to induce a compliance with this sys-
tem [the Constitution], may, in much less time, reprobate 
this in as severe terms as they now do the Confederation, 
and may as strongly urge the necessity of going as far 
beyond this as this is beyond the Confederation.lo 
While the Antifederalists were most accurate in their condem-
nation of some of the Federalist tactics, they seriously misjudged 
the basic Federalist objective. The Federalists were not primarily 
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guided by lust for power and economic gratification even though some 
would be able to obtain much of both. Instead, the Federalists re-
sponded to a breakdown in the heart of Antifederalist political doc-
trine, the state governments. Also, the Antifederalists, like the 
Progressive historians who were to take up the Antifederal cause 
once again in the twentieth century, could never completely prove a 
conspiracy in the nationalist ranks of 1787. 
By showing that many of the founding fathers did not gain any 
profit from the Constitution, the Nee-Conservatives successfully dis-
proved Beard's narrow economic thesis. Indeed, there is not any evi-
dence that the nationalists had in mind the profit that would accrue 
from their public securities when they altered the course of American 
constitutional government. The Nee-Conservatives have argued that the 
Constitution was an extension of the Revolution rather than an eco-
nomic document. Yet, even leaning heavily upon the idea of consensus 
in history, the Nee-Conservatives have not entirely dispelled the 
notion of a nationalist conspiracy, nor have they been able truly to 
explain the reason for success behind the second nationalist assault. 
lOElliot, II, pp. 250-51. 
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The Progressives were closer to the truth than has been imagined. The 
nationalists did form a dynamic and influential elite which transcended 
both economic considerations and sectional conflict. The whole con-
cept of "good" government was at stake, for as Gordon Wood has demon-
strated in The Creation of the American Republic, by the middle 
eighties the state governments were not creating virtuous laws and 
citizens. 11 The Revolution had unleashed a rampant democracy in the 
state legislatures, and the French foreign observer to the United 
States could claim in 1786 that "the licentiousness of a greedy pop-
12 
ulace has just shaken the basis of the governmento" At the Phila-
delphia Convention, one. nationalist warned that the nation's "chief 
danger arises from the democratic parts of our constitutions. 1113 In 
the democratic whirlwind of the 1780's, quality and justice were 
sacrificed to principles of equality, and no finer example can be 
found than in the debtor relief legislation which did not conform to 
any just or fair patterno 
During the Confederation period, some capable politicians had 
been replaced by petty demagogues who catered to the whims of local 
factions rather than to the interests of the state or nation, and, 
more often than not, a delegate's ability became a liability in getting 
elected to office on the state levelo As Edward Carrington explained, 
a great proportion of the people, being loaded with 
debt have found an interest in promoting measures 
11 Wood, p. 4650 
12Louis Otto to Count Vergennes, September 20, 1786, in Bancroft, 
II, Po 3950 
13 Farrand, ed., Records, I, p. 26. 
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directly opposed to good government, and have been 
solicitous to direct the public affairs, whilst 
better men have been inactive. • 14 
Bound by strict instructions from his constituents, a Congressional 
delegate was not only denied the freedom of independent thinking and 
creativity but also the authority to promote any law contrary to the 
wishes of his district. The process of government deteriorated into 
as complete a tyranny by the majority over the few as was the rule of 
the British monarch over the colonies. Turning the tables on the Anti-
federalist fear of despotism resulting in the Constitution, Madison 
argued "that turbulence, violence, and abuse of power, by the majority 
trampling on the rights of minority, have produced factions and com-
motions, which, in republics, have, more frequently than any other 
cause, produced despotism •. .,15 Realizing that "it is of great 
importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the 
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society 
16 
against the injustice of the other part," Madison and the Feder-
alists aimed their attack at the evil excess of democracy that they 
found deeply embedded in all the states. From the meeting at Annap-
olis to the inauguration of the new government in 1789 the Federalists 
worked together, though not under the guise of conspiracy, to subdue 
the egalitarian spirit of the Revolution, for it was precisely the 
belief that "all men are created equal" and therefore capable of 
14Edward Carrington to Thomas Jefferson, April 24, 1787, in 
Boyd, XI, p. 312. 
15Elliot, III, p. 87. 
16The Federalist, No. 51. 
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running a government that made the Confederation period a critical 
trial in republicanism. 
In the effort to lead the student of American history out of the 
maze of conflicting interpretations on the Constitution, Gordon Wood 
has recently woven the two strands of Progressive and Nee-Conservative 
thought together. He advanced a thesis that helps to explain more 
fully the second nationalist thrust. However, it is important to note 
that Wood's argument rests upon the literature and correspondence of 
the Federalists rather than upon research that yielded a demonstrated 
conspiracy. 
Even though the Nee-Conservatives may be correct in asserting 
that nearly all white males in America possessed the right to vote, 
the burden of governing the nation devolved on the "gentlemen." Empha-
sizing the radicalism of the Revolution and the reactionary character 
of the Constitution, Gordon Wood believed that 
through the artificial contrivance of the Constitution 
overlying an expanded society, the Federalists meant 
to restore and to prolong the traditional kind of 
elitist influence in politics that social developm19ts, 
especially since the Revolution, were undermining. 
While the Revolution had done much to destroy the notion that a wise, 
aristocratic elite had the social obligation to govern, the Consti-
tution of 1787 reaffirmed that view in explicit terms. According to 
Wood, any popular demagogue could rise to power in the state legis-
latures during the Confederation period, whereas superior politicians 
had been confined to the weak Continental Congress. After having been 
pushed out of state governments by levellers and back-country poli-
17 Wood, p. 513. 
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ticians, the Federalists determined to change the nature of the govern-
mental system and to return to power not through the states but by 
way of an invigorated national Congresso 
In their quest to rectify the evils of the Confederation period, 
it was not difficult for the Federalists to justify the necessity of 
erecting a government that would be thoroughly capable of preventing 
either a minority or a majority from capturing complete control. "By 
so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its 
several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means 
18 
of keeping each other in their proper places," Madison and the Feder-
alists were assured of achieving the first part of their program. 
With the proper checks and balances, neither a strong executive nor a 
tyrannical legislature could effectively usurp power. 
However, it was not quite so easy to convince the people of the 
need for the second part of the proposed reform. The Federalists 
desired that the people discard their obsessive trust in state legis-
latures and instead place their faith in a high-principled political 
elite. After making a close investigation of the problems of the 
Confederation period, Madison perceived that the representatives in the 
state legislatures were "more disposed to sacrifice the aggregate 
' d h . h 1 1 ° f h . . 1119 interest, an even aut ority, tote oca views o t eir constituents 
than would members of the natural aristocracy. Only those men not 
dominate.a by local bias could make the best legislators under the 
18The Federalist, No. 51. 
19 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 24, 1787, in Boyd, 
XII, p. 275. 
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Constitution, but Hamilton reassured the people that their views would 
b ' d b h ' l' t 20 not e ignore y t e governing e i e. Actually, the Federalists 
believed that local legislators had all too often practiced the arts 
of deception upon the people. In pleading on behalf of the Consti-
tution, Hamilton remarked that "the people commonly intend the public 
21 good" but did not always know the best methods of obtaining it. 
The Constitution was one such means because it was a well-devised 
government. However, an aq.ditional guarantee was needed. "The grand 
secret of forming a good government," contended Pelatiah Webster, ''is, 
to put good men into the administration: for wild, vicious or idle 
men, will ever make a bad government, let its principles be ever so 
22 good." The "good men" whom the Federalists had in mind were nat-
urally members of the Federalist party. Due to their wealth, connec-
tions, education and political savoir faire, the Federalists were 
confident that they possessed the proper attributes to govern on 
behalf of the people. As Madison phrased it in a.letter to Randolph, 
"there are subjects to which the capacities of the bulk of mankind are 
unequal, and on which they must and will be governed by those with whom 
they happen to have acquaintance. The proposed Constitution is of this 
d . . ,,23 escription. In making their direct appeal to the people, the 
Federalists asked that the people relinquish some of their governing 
20The Federalist, No. 35. 
21 Ibid., No. 71. 
22Pelatiah Webster, "The Weakness of Brutus exposed," in Ford, 
ed., Pamphlets, p. 131. 
23 James Madison to Edmund Randolph, January 10, 1788, in Hunt, 
V, p. 81. 
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power to a small, qualified elite, which would be free from corruption 
and perfectly capable of directing a national government. 
The Antifederalists could not accept the Federalist web of soph-
istry, nor could they be content with the reassurances of their op-
ponents. They refused to believe that the Federalists commanded an 
inviolable right to speak for the people. Since they concluded that 
"a substantial yeoman, of sense and discernment, will hardly ever be 
chosen1124 to the new national Congress, they feared that the govern-
ment would not be congenial to the interests of the people and that 
soon an aristocratic tyranny would gain full sway over the country. 
As Richard Henry Lee noted in his criticism of the Constitution, 
"every man of reflection must see, that the change now proposed, 
is a transfer of power from the many to the few. 1125 Defending the 
right of the people to govern themselves, the Antifederalists con-
demned this transfer because they felt it had the potential to des-
troy republicanism as they knew it. That the fears and the accusations 
of the Antifederalists were never fully realized after the adoption 
of the Constitution raises some doubt as to the idea of counterrevo-
lution by Federalists in 1787. Antifederalist organization and sen-
timent had almost totally evaporated by 1789, and it is inconceivable 
that disintegration this sudden would have occurred if the Federalists 
had proved to have been genuine conspirators, as Antifederalists had 
claimed. 
24Elliot, II, p. 246. 
25 R. H. Lee, "Letters from the Federal Farmer," in Ford, ed., 
Pamphlets, p. 317. 
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If Merrill Jensen and Forrest McDonald are correct in asserting 
that most of the people in the states experienced economic prosperity 
in the Confederation period, then one must wonder why the nationalists 
succeeded in 1787 at a project they had failed so miserably to carry 
in the early eighties. According to Gordon Wood, 
once men grasped, as they increasingly did in the middle 
eighties, that reform of the national government was the 
best means of remedying the evils caused by the state 
governments then the revision of the Articles assumed 
an impetus and an importance that it had not had a few 
years earlier,26 
As they had previously discovered under Robert Morris' leadership, 
the nationalists could never have hoped to ally all strong economic 
factions to their cause in 1787, for each state possessed its own 
peculiarities. Wood believed that it was only through emphasizing 
the grave possibility that all of society could be overturned that 
the Federalists were able to link those mildly skeptical of central-
ism and primarily interested in state affairs to the second nation-
alist thrust, If the state governments had managed somehow to 
maintain a high level of administration which could have curbed the 
lawlessness prevalent in some of the states, it is quite probable 
that the nationalists would have foundered in the midst of clashing 
factions as they had before. By focusing upon state disorders, the 
nationalists made it perfectly clear that a mere strengthening of 
the Articles would only magnify evils already present. Also, to 
have worked within the legal framework of the Articles would have 
thwarted the Federalist plan of placing members of their elite into 
26 Wood, p. 466. 
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the seats of government. Since the Federalists could not hope to 
infiltrate the state legislatures, then under the new plan the state 
governments had to be subordinate in power to the national government. 
The nationalists did execute a remarkable coup in conceiving a 
new republic which, while being based upon the consent of the people, 
27 
was actually far removed from the character of the people. A 
staunch Virginia Federalist rejoiced in a letter to Madison that 
"the People, the Origin of Power, cannot act personally, and can only 
, h , b , ,.28 exercise t eir power y representation. However, America was not 
a closed society. "Class did not depend upon inheritance but upon 
property. Since anyone could acquire property, anyone could rise, 
and the poor roan could and occasionally did become a wealthy esquire. 1129 
Social mobility was more prominent in America than in any European 
country, and even if the Federalists had so desired, they could not 
have closed the doorway into the governing elite. As David Ramsay 
explained, "the reins of state may be held by the son of the poorest 
roan, 'f d f l 't' 1 h ' t ' 1130 i possesse o qua i ies equa tot at iropor ant station. 
With the establishment of the Constitution, ability became the pre-
requisite for entering the ranks of the governing elite. Thus, ~ven 
if one were to accept Wood's contention that the Constitution was a 
27 b'd I i , 1 p. 475. 
28 Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, October 8, 1787, in David J. 
Mays, The Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton (Charlottesville, 
1967),~, p, 499.~-
29 Jackson T. Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America 
(Princeton, N. J., 1965), p. 220. 
30 , d II , h d f , d Davi Ramsay, Oration on t e A vantages o American In epen-
dence," quoted.in Wood, p. 479. 
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counterrevolution, he could still see how that counterrevolution was 
softened considerably by the nature of American society itself, 
However, to charge the nationalists with counterrevolution or 
conspiracy in the second nationalist thrust has not been an easy task 
for historians so inclined, In 1783, it is true, several nationalists 
were guilty of a conspiracy that faltered in the planning stages, but 
no historian has yet been able to prove conspiracy in the Federalist 
ranks in 1787. Professor McDonald has shown that the nationalists 
were not one s.olid economic interest group. Also, even though 
Gordon Wood has excelled at showing the concern and the growing 
awareness among the Federalist elite over the dangers of social 
radicalism, he did not demonstrate a conspiracy based on the actual 
political machinations of the Federalists. Thus, one may only 
speculate about the possibility of conspiracy from Wood's account. 
In future research on the problem of a nationalist conspiracy 
in 1787, one possible avenue to take would be an attempt to trans-
late Gordon Wood's demonstration of the Federalist "awareness" 
into actual plotting by the dynamic core of nationalists. For 
instance, before the Philadelphia Convention met in May, 1787, there 
is evidence in several letters that Madison desired to subvert the 
31 Articles and to establish a new, consolidated government. During 
the first four months of 1787 Madison attended sessions of the Con-
tinental Congress in New York, and the possibility should not be 
discounted that Madison secretly contacted other avid nationalists 
31see Madison's .letters to Thomas Jefferson, March 18, 1787; to 
Edmund Randolph, April 8, 1787; to George Washington, April 16, 1787, 
in Hunt, II. 
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such as Hamilton, and that they formed an interstate coalition under 
Madison's prompting. Certainly Madison was in an excellent position 
to have discussed the idea with other nationalists in New York and 
in the Continental Congress. Perhaps it was the meetings and schemes 
of staunch nationalists in New York which sufficiently alarmed New 
York into sending the only delegation with an Antifederalist majority 
to the Philadelphia Convention. New York may have been the only 
state to have perceived the plans for counterrevolution. At any 
rate, until the Federalists can be implicated in some kind of shady 
political machinations which united their ranks before the Phila-
delphia Convention officially met, then the Constitution can be 
seen only as a conservative reaction by concerned patriots. 
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